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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
CASTING A SHADOW ON A SOLAR COLLECTOR-A
CAUSE OF ACTION RECOGNIZED; AN
ALTERNATIVE RESOLUTION FRAMEWORK
SUGGESTED:
Prah v. Maretti
Despite federal and state efforts to encourage the development of
alternative energy sources,' courts and legislatures in the United States
have not fully protected 2 solar energy systems. 3 Until recently, most
commentators assumed that one could block the light to a neighbor's
solar collector without legal consequence.4 In this nation's first solar acI Among the federal legislation designed to encourage the use of alternative energy
sources, particularly solar energy, are: Solar Energy and Energy Conservation Bank Act of
1980, 12 U.S.C. § 3601 (1982) (loans to encourage use of solar energy and lessen dependence
on imported oil); National Energy Conservation Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1451, 1703-45
(Supp. V 1981) (loan insurance); Federal Energy Tax Act of 1978, I.R.C. § 44C (1976) (tax
credits for solar modifications); Small Business Energy Loan Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 631, 633, 636,
639 (1982) (loans to small businesses in solar technology); Energy Conservation and Production Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6881 (Supp. V 1981) (pilot solar energy project).
In addition, many state legislatures have enacted laws to encourage alternative energy
sources. See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 2 ("[L]egislature may, by general laws, exempt
from taxation . . . solar or wind-powered energy devices."); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66475.3
(West Supp. 1982) (allows subdivisions to dedicate solar easements for solar energy systems);
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 17959 (West Supp. 1982) (gives power to localities to require roof pitches and roof alignments for future installation of solar collectors); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 66.031-.033 (West. Supp. 1983) (gives counties power to issue solar permits, and requires that solar easements be written and recorded, see infra notes 69, 171-74 and accompanying text). For an extensive listing of state solar legislation, see Note, Solar Access Rights, 23
URBAN L. ANN. 437, 438 n.10, 456, table 1 (1982). Table Iin SolarAccess Rights was prepared
before Wisconsin passed the legislation discussed infra at notes 2, 72, 102, and 104.
2 Some state laws have attempted to give protection to solar access. See, e.g., Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 66.031 (West Supp. 1983) ("The legislature intends to: (a) Remove legal impediments which discourage use of solar energy while providing for the protection of individual property rights.
...
); f Note, supra note 1, at 440 ("Since twenty-three of the states
enacted solar easement statutes, one might conclude that local lawmakers consider that easements fully protect solar rights. Nevertheless, easements alone cannot assure solar access.")
Yet, only in New Mexico has the legislature clearly defined a system for solar access protection. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-3-1 to -3-5 (1978). See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
3 Solar energy systems are usually classified as passive or active. This Note focuses
primarily on active solar energy systems.
Active solar systems employ mechanical collecting devices, usually glass
panels placed on southern rooftop surfaces, to collect and hold solar heat.
The captured heat is both channeled to interior heating units and stored for
periods of inadequate light exposure.
Note, supra note 1, at 437 n.3 (citing S. KRAEMER, SOLAR LAw 12-17 (1978)).
4 See, e.g., Note, ObtainingAccess to SolarEnergy: Nuisance, Water Rights andZonigAdministration, 45 BROOKLYN L. REV. 357, 364 (1979) ("In spite of the seeming applicability of
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cess nuisance case, Prah v. Marett, 5 the Wisconsin Supreme Court broadened the protection for solar energy users. The court rejected the per se
non-nuisance conclusion traditionally used in blockage-of-light nuisance
claims. 6 The court recognized the importance of solar access and concluded that a complaint against the blockage of solar access stated a
claim of private nuisance 7 upon which relief could be granted. 8
The decision rejected nineteenth century policies and embraced
values befitting the last quarter of the twentieth century. 9 The court
favored the modified tort framework of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts t0 to resolve this solar access dispute. This Note suggests an alter-

nuisance principles to obstructions of light and air, American courts have refused to recognize
a nuisance action on the policy ground that the need for construction takes precedence over
the right to light."); Note, supra note 1, at 443, Comment, Obstruction ofSunlight as a Private
Nuisance, 65 CALIF. L. RaV. 94, 101 (1977) ("Logically, the courts should employ a similar
balancing test even if the obstruction serves a useful purpose. . . Yet the ironclad rule has
been that the obstruction of a neighbor's light and air is not a nuisance if it serves any useful
purpose.") (emphasis in original).
5
108 Wis. 2d 223, 321 N.W.2d 182 (1982); see also Brief for Natural Resources Defense
Council as Amicus Curiae at 4, Prah v. Maretti, 108 Wis. 2d 223, 321 N.W.2d 182 (1982)
(first appellate solar access case).
6 See inj/a notes 13-36, 65-67, 85-87, 112 and accompanying text. E.g., Fontainebleau
Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357, 359 (Fla. App. 1959) ("There
being, then, no legal right to the free flow of light and air from the adjoining land,
[blockage of] it does not give rise to a cause of action . .
'').
7 Private nuisances must be distinguished from public nuisances.
There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law than that
which surrounds the word "nuisance .
These two lines of development [private and public nuisances], the one
narrowly restricted to the invasion of interests in the use or enjoyment of land,
and the other extending to virtually any form of annoyance or inconvenience
interfering with common public rights, have led to the prevailing uncertainty
as to what a nuisance is. A private nuisance is a civil wrong, based on a
disturbance of rights in land. . . .A public or common nuisance, on the
other hand, is a species of catch-all criminal offense, consisting of an interference with the rights of the community at large ....
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 86, at 571-73 (4th ed. 1971) (footnotes omitted). The nuisance most often thought about in the solar context is a private nuisance. But see Note, supra
note 1, at 454 (arguing that recognition of private nuisance claims will gradually lead to
making obstruction of solar collector public nuisance).
Some critics argue that "the public-private nuisance dichotomy has little significance."
Beuscher & Morrison,JudicialZoning Through Recent Nuisance Cases, 1955 Wis. L. REv. 440; cf.
Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 183, 494 P.2d 700, 705 (1972) ("The
difference between a private nuisance and a public nuisance is generally one of degree.').
8 The case reached the Wisconsin Supreme Court on what appeared to be an appeal
from a summary judgment. See in/ia notes 58-59 and accompanying text. After deciding to
consider the case as an appeal from summary judgment, rather than from a judgment after
full trial, the court held "the plaintiff has stated a claim. . . upon which relief can be granted
. 108 Wis. 2d at 242, 321 N.W.2d at 192.
9 108 Wis. 2d at 239-240, 321 N.W.2d at 191; see in/a notes 90-112 and accompanying
text.
to 108 Wis. 2d at 240, 321 N.W.2d at 191;see in/ra notes 126-39 and accompanying text.
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native land use framework" for adjudicating solar access disputes. The
land use framework focuses on blameworthiness and efficiency in independent inquiries, with the more blameworthy party paying for the
most efficient result. 12 This approach will better ensure a fair yet efficient result than does the Restatement Second analysis favored by the Prah
court.

I
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Blockage-of-light nuisance claims have traditionally failed in common law courts. As early as 1586 the court in Bug , v. Pope 13 applied the
property maxim that one who owns the land owns up to the sky and
down to the center of the earth (cujus est solum, ejus est summitas usque ad
14
coelum et ad infernos) to reject a blockage-of-light nuisance claim.
Courts used this maxim to foreclose similar claims well into this century. 15 Conversely, courts decided other nuisance claims, such as creatI The framework suggested in this Note is an extrapolation of Rabin, Nuisance Law:
Rethinking FundamentalAssumptions, 63 VA. L. REv. 1299 (1977). See infira notes 149-53 and
accompanying text.
12 See infia notes 176-2 10 and accompanying text. With fairness and efficiency assured,
the court can protect solar access without unduly sacrificing competing property interests.
On the other hand, a per se non-nuisance conclusion or the Restatement Second framework will
produce inefficient land uses. See also Rabin, supra note 11, at 1309:
Because utility correlates well with both fairness and efficiency, a decision that is both fair and efficient is almost certain to be utilitarian. If decisionmaking could promote both fairness and efficiency, society, through the
legislature and the courts, would not need to choose between fairness and
utility as the ultimate goal. This would be true, as a practical matter, because
decisions that were both fair and efficient would also be utilitarian.
13
1 Cro. Eliz. 118, 78 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. 1586).
14 It was agreed by all the justices, that if two men be owners of two parcels of
land adjoining, and one of them doth build a house upon his land, and makes
windows and lights looking into the other's lands, and this house and the
lights have continued by the space of thirty or forty years, yet the other may
upon his own land and soil lawfully erect an [sic] house or other thing against
the said lights and windows, and the other can have no action; for it was his
folly to build his house so near to the other's land: and it was adjudged
accordingly.
Id
One commentator explained the use of maxims in the common law: "In many cases a
maxim merely restated a simple rule of law in a form which made it more easily remembered
or which endowed it with a solemn Latinity . ..
But even where the maxim was merely
making the law more orderly, it was, by that very fact making the law seem more natural."
D. BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE LAw 117 (1941) (illustrating this effect
with cujus est solum maxim). For an extensive treatment of the cujus est solum maxim, see C.
DONAHUE, T. KAuPER & P. MARTIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROPERTY 291-322, 375-79
(2d ed. 1983).
15 E.g., Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357 (Fla.
App. 1959) (no legal right to free flow of light and air from adjoining land); Granberry v.
Jones, 188 Tenn. 51, 52, 216 S.W.2d 721, 722 (1949) ("In so far as the bill alleges a deprivation of air and light by reason of the height of this shrubbery. . . the bill is without equity.").
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ing a "truly wretched" smell, under the tort maxim of use your own
property in such a manner as not to injure that of another (sicutere luo ut
alienum no laedas). 16 The modern law of nuisance grew out of these two
views of landownership. The common law courts used each maxim to
"decide" different types of cases, rather than combining them into a
t7
single nuisance doctrine.
By the end of the middle ages in England the less costly and less
time-consuming trespass-on-the-case, a tort action, had almost entirely
subsumed the property action of nuisance.18 Nuisance law formalized
into a tort framework, but never entirely escaped its property origins.19
This framework included both a few per se non-nuisances based on, the
cujus est solum property maxim 20 and many per se nuisances based on the
16 E.g., Tenant v. Goldwin, 2 Ld. Raym. 1089, 92 Eng. Rep. 222 (K.B. 1705) (broken
privy left unrepaired).
17 "The law of private nuisance is very largely a series of adjustments to limit the reciprocal right and privileges of both [landowners]." W. PROSSER, supra note 7, § 89, at 596; see
also Antonik v. Chamberlain, 81 Ohio App. 465, 78 N.E.2d 752, 759 (1947) ("[N]uisance law
plys [sic] between two antithetical extremes."); cf.J. BAKER, AN INTRODUcTION TO ENGLISH
LEGAL HISTORY 355 (2d ed. 1979):

When does a bad neighbor become a legal nuisance? One way of solving
such problems of policy was to treat the enjoyment of light and air and other
'commodities' as property rights, so that their infringement was ipso facto a
tort. But this approach was not comprehensive, because some rights were
recognised [sic] as attaching. . . independently of any grant or long usage. It
was therefore convenient to divide the interests protected by actions for nuisance into those which had to exist as property rights created by grant or
prescription, and those which were the natural incidents of land ownership in
general.
. . Illumination for a house may once have been regarded as a natural
right, acquired by whomsoever built his house first ....
But cf Comment, supra note 4, at 99 ("Ownership is qualified by nuisance law; it cannot
preclude the application of nuisance law.").
18 "The assizes of novel disseisin and nuisance . . . separated under Henry II." T.
PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 372 (5th ed. 1956); see also J.
BAKER, supra note 17, at 351 (assize of nuisance only for and against freeholders in twelfth
century); ef.A. HARDING, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 96 (1973) (easements incapable of exact definition recoverable by assize of nuisance); W. PROSSER, supra note 7, § 86, at
572 (nuisance "became fixed in the law as early as the thirteenth century with the development of the assize of nuisance, which was a criminal writ affording incidental civil relief . . .

.

"Case" for nontrespassory damage to realty "seems to be derived from the twelfth-century assize of nuisance, whose history is very obscure." J. BAKER, supra note 17, at 351-55
(replacement by end of fifteenth century, after some judicial struggles); T. PLUCKNETT, supra,
at 469 n.2. See generallv Brenner, Nuisance Law and the IndustrialRevolution, 3 J. LEGAL STUD.
403 (1974).
19 Before the nineteenth century, strict liablity governed both property law and tort law.
Nuisance suits were either absolutely privileged or absolutely forbidden. Courts required a
showing of "damage" and "injury" to win at nuisance, and there was no injury when the
defendant's activity was absolutely privileged. See 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 534 (1959) ("IfI erect a mill upon my land and so subtract customers from
your mill, I do you damage, but no injury. We see here [in Bracton] an incipient attempt to
analyze the actionable wrong.

20

. . ."); cf.J. BAKER, supra note 17, at 355.

In addition to blockage of light, blockage of percolating water was also a per se non-
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sic utere tort maxim. 2' Courts accepted, however, some affirmative de'22
and "extrasensitivity. '2 3
fenses, such as "coming to the nuisance
Common law evolution modified the formal tort framework during
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 24 Initially, the courts only used
nuisance. Acton v. Blundell, 12 Mees. & W. 324, 354, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223, 1235 (Ex. 1843);
Hanson v. McCue, 42 Cal. 303 (1871); accord Comment, supra note 4, at 102.
On the evolution of percolating water doctrine, see Note, Henderson v. Wade Sand &
Gravel Co.: A Prototypefor Economic Analysis in Strict Liability Cases, 33 ALA. L. REv. 199, 204
(1981) (common law or English rule of percolating water law is based on the maxim cujus est
solum).
21 E.g., Aldred's Case, 9 Co. Rep. 57, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (KB. 1611) (odor from pig sty:
even though plaintiff argued pigs are necessary, sic utere maxim applied); Jones & Powell,
Palm. 536, 81 Eng. Rep. 1208 (K.B. 1628) (no defense of reasonableness or usefulness of brewery); Tenant v. Goldwin, 2 Ld. Raym. 1089, 22 Eng. Rep. 222 (KB. 1705 (sic utere maxim
applied); see also J. BAKER, supra note 17, at 358 (from 1629 on it was clear that "if an activity
amounted to a nuisance, it was actionable regardless of its utility; and this is the present
law"). But cf. Brenner, supra note 17, at 406-07 (noting small number of suits against industries; because of cost of getting injunction and small likelihood of winning damage award on
"case').
22 E.g., Rex v. Cross, 2 Car. & P. 484, 172 Eng. Rep. 219 (K.B. 1826) (dictum) ("If a
certain noxious trade is already established in a place remote from habitations. . . and persons afterwards come and build houses within the reach of its noxious effects;. . . [then] in
those cases the party would be entitled to continue his trade . . .).
23 E.g., Webb v. Bird, 10 C.B.(N.S.) 268,142 Eng. Rep. 455 (Ex. 1861). But see Aldred's
Case, 9 Co. Rep. 57, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (K.B. 1611) (argued that plaintiff should not be so
sensitive, plea rejected). The common law courts may have disfavored the extrasensitivity
defense because it clashes with the general tort theory that you take the victim as you find
him.
24 It is a general rule that every person may exercise exclusive dominion over his
own property, and subject it to such uses as will best subserve his private
interests. Generally, no other person can say how he shall use or what he shall
do with his property. But this general right of property has its exceptions and
qualifications. Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas is an old maxim which has a
broad application. It does not mean that one must never use his own so as to
do any injury to his neighbor or his property. Such a rule could not be enforced in civilized society ...
But every person is bound to make a reasonable use of his property so as
to occasion no unnecessary damage or annoyance to his neighbor.
Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N.Y. 568, 576-77 (1876). The evolution can be seen in the changes
wrought upon the three aspects of the formal tort approach. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text. For example, the per se non-nuisance of percolating water blockage gave way
to a "reasonable use" rule prohibiting "spite wells." This rule prohibited purely malicious
interference with percolating water. Greenleaf v. Francis, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 117 (1839)
(action allowed for purely malicious spite well); Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294 (1861)
(reserved for future question of recovery for purely malicious interference with percolating
water). The "spite well" reasonable use rule has now given way, in some states, to a rule that
requires full balancing of interests.
Similarly, the per se nuisance conclusion in pollution cases gave way to a balancing of
equities. Compare Sullivan v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 208 Pa. 540, 555, 57 A. 1065, 1071
(1904) (no balancing; must grant injunction to home owner injured by pollution from steel
mill) with Elliot Nursery Co. v. Duquesne Light Co., 281 Pa. 166, 173, 177, 126 A. 345, 346,
348 (1924) (did not overrule Sullivan, but limited Sullivan's holding to solid industrial wastes
and refused to shut down power plant even though it injured plaintiff's nursery business).
The affirmative defenses, never really absolute, are now often not even persuasive; e.g.,
Pendoley v. Ferreira, 345 Mass. 309, 312, 187 N.E.2d 142, 145 (1963) (rural community became primarily residential; pig farm that was without fault in rural area, "has, with the
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this modified approach in cases when the formal tort approach yielded
an egregious result, such as allowing the construction of a "spite well,"' 25
mandating the closing of an important factory, 26 or permitting the continued operation of a hog farm to thwart suburban development.2 7 Today courts judge almost every case under the modified approach that
accommodates dominion over property with the duty not to injure
28
another.
In contrast, the harsh per se conclusion of no nuisance in blockage29
of-light cases has continued virtually unmodified in the United States.
Although English courts softened the per se conclusion under the an30
cient lights doctrine, which allowed a prescriptive easement for light,
this doctrine never flourished in the United States. 31 Unless the plaintiff
change in the environs of the farm to a residential district, become unreasonable"); Gronn v.
Rogers Const., Inc., 221 Ore. 226, 232, 350 P.2d 1086, 1089 (1960) (Plaintiff's use as mink
farm is extra-sensitive. "But a sensitive use is entitled to protection if the conduct of the
defendant is unreasonable with respect to that sensitive use."). But see Spur Indus. Inc. v. Del
E. Webb Dev. Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972) (coming to nuisance important, not for
entitlement, but for deciding who will pay costs of resolving conflict); see also injfa notes 152,
197-99 and accompanying text.
25 The initial modification of the per se non-nuisance conclusion was in the "spite well"
situation. See supra note 24. In addition, the major modification in the per se non-nuisance
conclusion in blockage-of-light cases has been the prohibition of "spite fences." Burke v.
Smith, 69 Mich. 380, 37 N.W. 838 (1888) (relying on principle of prohibition against spite
wells). See infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
26 E.g., Elliot Nursery Co. v. Duquesne Light Co., 281 Pa. 166, 126 A. 345 (1924).
27 E.g., Pendoley v. Ferreira, 345 Mass. 309, 187 N.E.2d 142 (1963).
28 Eg., Prah v. Maretti, 108 Wis. 2d 223, 238, 321 N.W.2d 182, 190 (1982) (refusing to
apply approach "favoring the unrestricted development of land and of applying a rigid and
inflexible rule protecting. . . right to build. . .[that disregards] any interest of the plaintiff
in the use and enjoyment of his land"); cf Harrison v. Indiana Auto Shredders Co., 528 F.2d
1107, 1120-21 (7th Cir. 1976) (footnotes omitted):
Judicial involvement in solving environmental problems does, however,
bring its own hazards. Balancing the interests of a modem urban community
• . .may be very difficult. ...
• . .If necessary, the courts are qualified to perform the task. The courts
are skilled at "balancing the equities," a technique that traditionally has been
one of the judicial functions. ...
29 E.g., Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357, 359
(Fla. App. 1959) ("There being. . . no legal right to the free flow of light..., it is universally held that where a structure serves a useful and beneficial purpose, it does not give rise to
a cause of action. . . even though it causes injury to another. . . regardless of the fact that
the structure may have been erected partly for spite."); Musmeci v. Leonardo, 77 R.I. 255,
260, 75 A.2d 175, 177 (1950) ("Under the common law as it is generally applied in America
an adjacent proprietor has no right to light and air coming to him across the land of his
neighbor.").
30 The doctrine of ancient lights was alluded to in Bury v. Pope, I Cro. Eliz. 118, 78
Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. 1586), although apparently in that case, the prescriptive period was longer
than 40 years. See also J. BAKER, supra note 17, at 355. See generaly Note, supra note 4, at 35760.
31 See Lynch v. Hill, 24 Del. Ch. 86, 6 A.2d 614 (1939) (overruled doctrine of ancient
lights as established in Clawson v. Primrose, 4 Del. Ch. 643 (1873)); Fontainebleau Hotel
Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d at 359 (" '[A]ncient lights' has been unanimously repudiated in this country.'); Prah v. Maretti, 108 Wis. 2d at 233 n.8, 321 N.W.2d at
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in the United States acquired an express easement, he had no judicially
protected right to receive light, even if the blockage of light served no
32
useful purpose.
At the end of the nineteenth century, some courts and legislatures
in the United States began prohibiting purely malicious blockages of
light, 33 labelling them "spite fences."'34 The prohibition did not extend
to cases of mixed malicious and nonmalicious motives. 3 5 Any blockage
caused by the construction of a building was exempt from nuisance liability, even when a malicious motive predominated. 36 Because plaintiffs
must still prove that the defendant's motives were purely malicious,
twentieth century plaintiffs, when threatened with a blockage of their
light, are as unprotected as their nineteenth century counterparts.
Many commentators have applauded the shift away from the formal tort approach to nuisances and have advocated a land use framework for resolving nuisance disputes.3 7 Similarly, many commentators
on solar access protection have suggested a modified tort,38 or land
use, 39 framework to recognize a claim of solar access blockage. Most
solar access commentators have urged protection of solar access through
legislation, easements, zoning, or restrictive covenants. Although nui188 n.8 ("No American common law state recognizes a landowner's right to acquire an easement of light by prescription.') (citing Pfeiffer, Ancient Lights: Legal Protection of Access to Solar
Ener,, 68 A.B.A. J. 288 (1982)).
32 See, e.g., Mahan v. Brown, 13 Wend. 260 (N.Y. 1835) (lawful act is not made unlawful
by defendant's motive); accord Cohen v. Perrino, 355 Pa. 455, 50 A.2d 348 (1947); Metzger v.
Hochrein, 107 Wis. 267, 272, 83 N.W. 308, 310 (1900) ("[H]is sovereign right in his own
property. . . may be so exercised as to violate the moral obligations which every member of
society owes to his neighbors, without any penalty being visited upon him . . .
33 E.g., Burke v. Smith, 69 Mich. 380, 37 N.W. 838 (1888); 1903 Wis. Laws ch. 81 (giving nuisance remedy in direct response to outcome in Metzger; see supra note 32).
34 E.g., Musumeci v. Leonardo, 77 R.I. 255, 256, 75 A.2d 175 (1950) ("[A] fence erected
on one's own land with the intent to deprive an adjacent landowner of light and air is...
popularly called a 'spite fence.'").
35 Cf. Schorck v. Epperson, 74 Wyo. 286, 295, 287 P.2d 467, 470 (1955):
It cannot be surprising that the cases above mentioned [requiring pure
spite for any recovery] were cautiously feeling their way. It was hard enough
at first to break away from the former rule [spite immaterial] as announced by
many without going further than absolutely necessary. There is no reason,
however, for saying that these cases spoke the last word on the subject. The
time was bound to come when that rule would come under scrutiny and the
acid test of reason. It could not permanently, in this changing world, be or
remain one to the effect that a fence is lawful if it subserved some useful purpose, however slight such useful purpose would be.
36 E.g., Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357, 358
(Fla. App. 1959).
37 Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability." One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089 (1972); Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance
Rules, andFines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CiHi. L. REV. 681 (1973); Rabin, supra note 11. But
see Epstein, Nuisance Law.- CorrectiveJustice and its UtilitarianConstraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49
(1979).
38 E.g., Note, supra note 1; Comment, supra note 4.
39

E.g., Note, supra note 4.
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sance law should not be the sole protection for solar access, Prah v.
Aaretti demonstrates that solar access disputes may slip through the interstices of these protective devices. 40 Courts facing the inevitable solar
access nuisance claim must either dispose of the claim with the nineteenth century per se non-nuisance conclusion or recognize a cause of
action and resolve the conflict.
II
PRAH

v

MARETTI

In 1978 Prah built his partially solar-powered home, 4 1 the first
42
home in the Lake Brittany Estates subdivision of Muskego, Wisconsin.
The home was off-center to the south, but it complied with zoning ordinances and restrictive covenants. 43 Maretti purchased the southern adjoining lot in 197944 and submitted proposed house plans to the Lake

Brittany Estates Architectural Control Board (Board) in September
1980. 45 Maretti contemplated a two-story house located ten feet from
Prah's lot line at a grade of 785.5 feet above sea level. 46 Prah objected
on the ground that the house would cast a shadow on Prah's solar collec40
For alternative methods of protecting solar access, see the authorities cited supra at
note 4. These other methods-zoning, easements, and restrictive covenants---should bear the
primary burden of protecting solar energy users. Nevertheless, in all human endeavors, disputes occur despite private and legislative solutions to prevent them. For example, in Prah v.
Mareti; although the Architectural Review Board and the city building inspector approved
Maretti's plans, the particular lay of his lot and position of Prah's solar collector created a
dispute. Even though the Wisconsin legislation has subsequently created a system of solar
access rights, see supra note 2, the system may not be implemented in some municipalities. 108
Wis. 2d at 255, 321 N.W.2d at 199 (Callow, J., dissenting). In addition, the system is ineffective in dealing with preexisting obstructions.
41
In the principal case, the solar energy system consisted of:

[S]olar collectors located on the roof of Prah's home . . . used by Prah to
supply heat and hot water in his home. . . . The heat generated by the solar
collectors is used to heat water which is pumped through the roof and then
recirculated to a storage tank in the basement. The heated water is used to
heat the home and provide the power for certain utilities. The annual cost
savings realized by Mr. Prah in each prior year approximated $600 per year
. . [for]
[
approximately 55-60% of his energy requirements. [Prah spent] approximately $18,000 for the installation of [his] solar energy system, . . .
[which] required the placement of solar collectors on the entire southern roof
exposure of the home.
Brief for Appellant at 1-4, Prah v. Maretti, 108 Wis. 2d 223, 321 N.W.2d 182 (1982).
42
Prah v. Maretti, 108 Wis. 2d 223, 225-46, 321 N.W.2d 182, 184-85 (1982); see also
Brief for Appellant at 2-3.
43
108 Wis. 2d at 226, 321 N.W.2d at 185; see also Brief for Respondent at 9, Prah v.
Maretti, 108 Wis. 2d 223, 321 N.W.2d 182 (1982) ("North wall of his home was located 23
feet from his North lot-line, and the South wall of his home was located 11 feet from his South
lot-line . . .
45

Brief for Appellant at 4.
Id

46

Id at 4-5.

44
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tor.47 Eventually, 48 Maretti obtained the Board's approval for a twentyfoot setback from Prah's line.49 He also received the City of Muskego's
approval, although at the natural grade level of 787.5 feet, rather than
his originally proposed 785.5 feet. 50 Prah notified Maretti that a house
with the twenty-foot setback at the natural grade level would still interfere with the solar energy system. 5 ' Nevertheless, Maretti began
52
construction.
Prah filed suit and moved for a temporary injunction.5 3 The circuit
court, after taking testimony, receiving affidavits, and viewing the construction site, denied Prah's motion. 54 The court found that the "plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which equitable relief can be
granted" and asked for "a motion by defendant for summary judgment."'55 Maretti failed to bring the motion, so Prah submitted an order
47 Id at 5; see Prah, 108 Wis. 2d at 226, 321 N.W.2d at 185 ("Plaintiff advised defendant
that if the defendant's home were built at the proposed site it would cause a shadowing effect
on the solar collectors which would reduce the efficiency of the system and possibly damage
the system."). This reduction in efficiency would "defeat in large part the annual fuel savings
heretofore realized by Mr. Prah. The freezing condition. . . would result in a cracking of the
solar collectors thereby causing serious damage not only to the collectors themselves but also
causing significant water damage to the home as well." Brief for Appellant at 4; see also id at
A-27 to -28 (noting that according to expert, collectors were built into roof such that if collector plates froze, cracked, and leaked, home's interior would be damaged; shadowing of plates
could cause such cracking; expert asserted that if collectors are in shadow they probably will
freeze during their lifetime).
48 The court noted: "There appears to be some dispute over the facts that immediately
preceded the initiation of construction concerning the granting of building permits, approval
of the Architectural Control Committee and subsequent initiation of construction at a grade
level not approved by the Committee." 108 Wis. 2d at 226 n.2, 321 N.W.2d at 185 n.2. Prah
contended that the parties agreed initially that Maretti would build 25 feet south of his north
property line, but that Maretti later submitted to the Architectural Control Board a plan to
build only 10 feet south of the north line. Prah claimed that the Board then temporarily
rescinded approval. Brief for Appellant at 5-6. Maretti rebutted that he only agreed to discuss with his builder the proposal that the house be moved to 25 feet south of the line and
that he later told Prah he would only move it to 17 feet south of the line. Brief for Respondent at 11-12.
49 Brief for Appellant at 6, A-8 to -12; see also Brief for Respondent at 12.
50 See 108 Wis. 2d at 226, 321 N.W.2d at 185 ("After such approval, the defendant
apparently changed the grade of the property without prior notice to the Architectural Control Committee."). Maretti claimed that Muskego "directed" that the grade be at 787.5 feet.
Brief for Respondent at 12. Prah contended that the city would have approved a grade
variance to 785.5 feet. Brief for Appellant at 6.
51 [T]he primary problem with the proposed construction was a combination of
grade and distance between the homes. The entire problem could have been
rectified by increasing the distance between the two homes or reducing the
grade of the Maretti home. Although the movement of the Maretti home an
additional 10 feet to the south had reduced the shadow, the increase in the
grade had compounded the problem since the degree of shadow is a function
of the distance between the two homes and the height of the Maretti home.
Brief for Appellant at 6-7 (citations omitted).
52
108 Wis. 2d at 225, 321 N.W.2d at 184.
53 Id at 226, 321 N.W.2d at 184.
54 Id at 226-27, 321 N.W.2d at 184-85.
55 Id at 228, 321 N.W.2d at 185.
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for judgment in conformity with the court's memorandum decision. 56
5 7
Prah then appealed from this order to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.
The court of appeals certified the appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme
Court as a question of first impression, "namely, whether an owner of a
solar-heated residence states a claim upon which relief can be granted
when he asserts that his neighbor's proposed construction of a residence
. . .interferes with his access to an unobstructed path of sunlight across
his neighbor's property."5 8 The Wisconsin Supreme Court heard argument on three substantive issues: 59 common law nuisance, 60 statutory
nuisance, 61 and prior appropriation (as applied to water allocation in
western states and solar access in New Mexico). 62 The court held that
56
Compare id at 227, 321 N.W.2d at 185 ("The circuit court ... declared it would
entertain a motion for summary judgment and thereafter entered judgment in favor of the
defendant.") with Brief for Appellant at 7-8 ("The Defendant, however, refused to submit an
order in conformity with the Court's Memorandum Decision. Plaintiff-appellant thereafter
submitted a proposed Revised Order for Judgment in conformity with the Court's Memorandum Decision. That order was signed by the Court .... ") (citations omitted) and Brief for
Respondent at 13 ("The Order for Judgment, which was prepared by Plaintiff-Appellant's
counsel, was signed by the court . . . . Defendant-Respondent refrained from bringing on
the aforesaid motion due to the failure of Plaintiff-Appellant to appear for a deposition pursuant to an agreement .... ").
57
Brief for Appellant at 8; Brief for Respondent at 13.
58 108 Wis. 2d at 224, 321 N.W.2d at 184.
59 The Respondent argued that "the Trial Court's Decision must not be viewed as a
decision granting the defendant summary judgment pursuant to Sec. 802.06, Wis. Stats., but
rather as an order for judgment." Brief for Respondent at 14. Neither party brought a motion for summary judgment under Wis. STAT. § 802.08 (1977). In addition, the Revised Order for Judgment, submitted by the plaintiff and signed by the circuit court, states:
"Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed upon its merits."
Nevertheless, the court treated "this as an appeal from a judgment entered on a motion
for summary judgment." 108 Wis. 2d at 228, 321 N.W.2d at 185.
60 The common law nuisance action was based on a theory of private nuisance. See supra
note 7.
61
The statutory nuisance claim was based on Wis. STAT. § 844.01 (1977):
(1) Any person owning or claiming an interest in real property may
bring an action claiming physical injury to, or interference with, the property
or his interest therein; the action may be to redress past injury, to restrain
further injury, to abate the source of injury, or for other appropriate relief.
(2) Physical injury includes unprivileged intrusions and encroachments;
the injury may be surface, subsurface or suprasurface; the injury may arise
from activities on the plaintiff's property, or from activities outside the plaintiff's property which affect plaintiff's property.
(3) Interference with an interest is any activity other than physical injury which lessens the possibility of use or enjoyment of the interest.
The court noted "We can find no reported cases in which sec. 844.01 has been interpreted
and applied, and the parties do not cite any." 108 Wis. 2d at 229 n.3, 321 N.W.2d at 186 n.3.
62 The prior appropriation doctrine has been used in the western United States to allocate water. "It provides that the first appropriator of water for a beneficial use is uniformly
recognized as having a right to the continued use of that water to the exclusion of subsequent
users of the same water." Supplemental Brief for Appellant at 11-12. The application of
water rights law to the solar access context is discussed at some length in Note, supra note 4, at
368-78.
New Mexico framed its solar protection legislation on the prior appropriation doctrine.
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the plaintiff stated a cause of action in common law nuisance and there63
fore did not address the other two issues.
Justice Abrahamson, writing for the court, first noted that plaintiff's complaint "appeared" to state a claim under the Restatement (Second) of Torts definition of private nuisance: "a nontrespassory invasion
of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land."6" The
court explained that the common law courts had given some minimal
protection to the right to receive light and then examined the reluctance
of those courts to extend that protection. 65 The court concluded that
the policy considerations of the nineteenth century "are no longer fully
accepted or applicable [because they] reflect factual circumstances and
social priorities that are now obsolete. ' 66 On this basis, the court reNew Mexico's statute is discussed in Note, The Allocation of Sunlight; Solar Rights and the Prior
AppropriationDoctrine, 45 U. COLO. L. REV. 421 (1976).
As applied to water rights, this doctrine deals with the allocation of a single resource. On
its face, Prab v. Maretti is not an allocation case, but rather a case of competing resources: light
and land. See supra text accompanying note 58. Nevertheless, in another sense Prah v. Maretti
is an allocation case: "As the facts elicited at the trial indicate, the Defendant-Respondent is
installing a solar system of his own." Brief for Respondent at 35. A major portion of the
blockage could be avoided if the respondent would place his chimney on a wall other than his
north wall. Brief for Appellant at A-26 (citing the transcript of Oct. 21, 1980 proceedings,
testimony of Glenn Prah, Record No. 24, at 24). The defendant may well have placed his
chimney on the north wall to avoid casting a shadow on his own solar collector. If this explanation is correct, then Prah v. Maretti is actually a dispute over the allocation of sunlight.
63 108 Wis. 2d at 242-43, 321 N.W.2d at 192.
64 Id at 231-32, 321 N.W.2d at 187 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D
(1977)). TheRestatement Second definition is overinclusive, sweeping in many activities that are
excused. Cf Comment, Nuisanceas a Modem Mode of Land Use Control, 46 WASH. L. REV. 47, 49
(1970) (nuisance law cannot be successfully distilled into 14 words).
65 108 Wis. 2d at 233-38, 321 N.W.2d at 188-98 ("The defendant is not completely correct in asserting that the common law did not protect a landowner's access to sunlight across
adjoining property."). Id at 233, 321 N.W.2d at 188. The court first discussed the doctrine of
ancient lights. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. "At English common law a
landowner could acquire a right to receive sunlight across adjoining land by both express
agreement and under the judge-made doctrine of 'ancient lights.'" 108 Wis. 2d at 233, 321
N.W.2d at 188. The court then acknowledged that the doctrine had not been adopted in the
United States. Yet, "American courts have afforded some protection to a landowner's interest
in access to sunlight." Id The court detailed the development of spite fences, see supra notes
32-36 and accompanying text, and concluded that "a landowner's interest in sunlight has
been protected in this country by common law private nuisance law at least in the narrow
context of the modern American rule invalidating spite fences." 108 Wis. 2d at 234-35, 321
N.W.2d at 189.
66 108 Wis. 2d at 236, 321 N.W.2d at 189. The court recognized "that common law
rules adapt to changing social values and conditions." Id at 238, 321 N.W.2d at 190. Citing
Justice Douglas in a footnote, the court added: "If this were not so, we must succumb to a
rule that a judge should let others 'long dead and unaware of the problems of the age in
which he lives, do his thinking for him.'" 108 Wis. 2d at 238 n.12, 321 N.W.2d at 190 n.12
(quoting Douglas, Stare Decisi, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 736 (1949), quoted in Bielski v.
Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 11, 114 N.W.2d 105, 110 (1962)). The court concluded that "[tihe
genius of the common law is its ability to adapt itself to the changing needs of society." 108
Wis. 2d at 238 n.12, 321 N.W.2d at 190 n.12 (quoting Moran v. Quality Aluminum Canning
Co., 34 Wis. 2d 542, 551, 150 N.W.2d 137, 141 (1967)).
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jected a per se non-nuisance conclusion and remanded the case to the
circuit court, holding that "the reasonable use doctrine as set forth in
67
the Restatement" be applied in further proceedings.
Justice Callow, in dissent, rejected the court's conclusion that the
nineteenth century policy considerations are no longer valid 68 and argued that these policies should control in Prah v. Mareti He also suggested that the enactment of solar access legislation made a decision in
Prah v. Maretti unnecessary. 69 Finally, Justice Callow argued that there
was no invasion of Prah's right to use and enjoy his property, 70 and that
7
Prah should not prevail because his use of the land was extra-sensitive. '
Justice Callow reasoned that allowing a cause of action in this case
would shake "the very foundation of property law [which] encompasses
a system of filing and notice .... "72 For these reasons, Justice Callow
would not have recognized a cause of action for common law nuisance
67

108 Wis. 2d at 240, 321 N.W.2d at 191.
Yet the defendant would have us ignore the flexible private nuisance law
as a means of resolving the dispute between the landowners in this case and
would have us adopt an approach, already abandoned in [a prior Wisconsin
case], of favoring the unrestricted development of land and of applying a rigid
and inflexible rule protecting his right to build on his land and disregarding
any interest of the plaintiff in the use and enjoyment of his land. This we
refuse to do.

We therefore hold that private nuisance law . . . is applicable to the
instant case.
Id at 238-40, 321 N.W.2d at 190-91 (footnotes omitted).
68 Id at 244, 321 N.W.2d at 193 (Callow, J., dissenting) ("The majority has failed to
convince me that these policies are obsolete.").
69 "The legislature has recently acted in this area. Chapter 354. . .(effective May 7,
1982), was enacted to provide the underlying legislation enabling local governments to enact
ordinances establishing procedures for guaranteeing access to sunlight. This court's intrusion
into an area where legislative action is being taken is unwarranted ....
"108 Wis. 2d at
249, 321 N.W.2d at 195 (Callow, J., dissenting).
Legislative action in 1982, of course, should not preclude Prah from obtaining relief for a
cause of action that arose in 1979. Also, the legislation enables municipalities to elect not to
enact the permit scheme. Nuisance law is well suited to handle the cases that slip between the
permit scheme and restrictive covenants. See supra note 40 and accompanying text; accord
Harrison v. Indiana Auto Shredders Co., 528 F.2d 1107, 1121 (7th Cir. 1976) ("All other
forums for obtaining relief were cut-off from the claimants and they understandably turned to
the courts for relief."); Comment, supra note 64, at 53.
70 108 Wis. 2d at 250-51, 321 N.W.2d at 196-97; seeinfra notes 84-85 and accompanying
text.
71 "I conclude that plaintiff's solar heating system is an unusually sensitive use. ...
'The plaintiff cannot, by devoting his own land to an unusually sensitive use . . . make a
nuisance out of conduct of the adjoining defendant which would otherwise be harmless.' "
108 Wis. 2d at 252-53, 321 N.W.2d at 197 (Callow, J., dissenting) (quoting W. PROSSER,supra
note 7, § 87, at 578-79). But see Gronn v. Rogers Constr., Inc., 221 Ore. 226, 232, 350 P.2d
1086, 1089 (1960) ("[A] sensitive use is entitled to protection if the conduct of the defendant is
unreasonable with respect to that sensitive use.").
72 108 Wis. 2d at 254, 321 N.W.2d at 198. Callow argued that there was no notice of
Prah's use of a solar collector. Prah's solar collectors, however, were visible and should have
put Maretti on notice that Prah was interested in the sunlight flowing across Maretti's lot.
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given the facts in Prah v. Marett 73
III
ANALYSIS

In Prah v. Maretti, the Wisconsin Supreme Court correctly concluded that blocking light from striking a solar collector may be a private nuisance, recognizing that solar access is one of many important
land use interests. 74 The policies supporting earlier reluctance to protect
the receipt of light are no longer appropriate. Instead, a balancing of
interests under nuisance law "will promote the reasonable use and enjoyment of land in a manner suitable to the 1980's" 75 and beyond.
The court favored "the reasonable use doctrine as set forth in the
Restatement [(Second) of Torts]" for adjudicating the Prah-Maretti dispute.76 The Restatement Second nuisance framework, however, retains vestiges of formal tort law and thus is not flexible enough to achieve the
balancing of interests advocated by the court. 77 A land use framework,
on the other hand, is unfettered by the formalism of tort law and can
provide a fair and efficient resolution to solar access disputes. 78 This
Further, Prah objected to Maretti's design and location at the Board meeting and notified
Maretti of the lawsuit before construction began.
Callow bolstered the notice argument with an excerpt from the recently enacted Wisconsin solar access legislation. 108 Wis. 2d at 254-55, 321 N.W.2d at 198; see also supra note 69.
The legislation enables localities to grant recordable solar access permits. Wis. STAT. ANN. §
66.032(5) and (6) (West Supp. 1983). The legislature also recognized that the right to establish a renewable energy resource easement was unclear prior to that legislation. Id. at
§ 66.031. The legislature had not clearly expressed requirements for recording solar easements prior to the 1982 legislation.
In addition, Prah should have been able to secure such a permit, had the permit system
been in existence in 1978 when he built his home. The system requires notification of the
application for a solar permit to any neighboring landowners. Id § 66.032(3)(b). Prah alleged that he inquired as to the intentions of Maretti's predecessor to determine whether the
owner's proposed use of that property would interfere with the proposed solar heating system
contemplated by the Prahs. Brief for Appellant at A-26 (quoting complaint, Record No. 2, at
1).Prah indicated at the trial court hearings "that he had procured a verbal agreement from
the Respondent's predecessor in title to the effect that said predecessor in title would not
build a home which would interfere with the Appellant's solar system." Supplemental Brief
for Respondent at 7.
A permit should be granted unless, (1) it would unreasonably interfere with orderly land
development, (2) the permit would disrupt someone's current residence or present plans to
build a residence, or (3) the burden of the permit outweighs the benefit to the public and the
applicant. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.032(5)(a) (West Supp. 1983). If Prah's plans received approval of the Board and the city building inspector, and if Maretti's predecessor would not
have complained, there would have been no reason to deny Prah's application.
73 108 Wis. 2d at 257, 321 N.W.2d at 199.
74 Id at 236, 321 N.W.2d at 189; cf.supra note 1.
75 108 Wis. 2d at 240, 321 N.W.2d at 191.
76 Id
77 See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text; infra notes 126-39 and accompanying
text.
78 See infra notes 149-211 and accompanying text.
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Note explains the court's recognition of a nuisance claim and suggests a
land use framework for resolving solar access disputes.
A. A Cause of Action Recognized
The primary issue in Prah v. Maretti was whether the per se nonnuisance conclusion was justified in blockage-of-light cases, or whether
such cases warranted a full trial on the merits. 79 The majority concluded that policies from the nineteenth century no longer justified a per
se non-nuisance conclusion, especially in obstructed solar access cases,80
and held that a nuisance claim must be recognized. 8 1

82
The dissent attacked the court's recognition of a nuisance claim

and argued that this case presented no cause of action,83 primarily because of the absence of a physical invasion. 84 The physical invasion test,
however, is merely a rule of thumb for separating actionable and nonac79
108 Wis. 2d at 224, 242, 321 N.W.2d at 184, 192 ("Summary judgment is not an
appropriate procedural vehicle in this case when the circuit court must weigh evidence which
has not been presented at trial.").
80 See supra note 66 and accompanying text; infra
notes 90-113 and accompanying text.
81
108 Wis. 2d at 240, 321 N.W.2d at 191 ("Recognition of a nuisance claim for unreasonable obstruction of access to sunlight will not prevent land development or unduly hinder
the use of adjoining land.").
82 The dissent's implicit attack on the recognition of a nuisance had two major prongs.
First, prior cases had not recognized a right to light, see id.at 244-45, 321 N.W.2d at 193-94
(Callow, J., dissenting), and second, no nuisance exists without a physical invasion, see infra
notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
In the first prong of the attack, the dissent states: "It is a fundamental principle of law
that a 'landowner owns at least as much of the space above the ground as he can occupy or
use in connection with the land.'" 108 Wis. 2d at 244-45, 321 N.W.2d at 193-94 (Callow, J.,
dissenting) (quoting United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946)). Yet, Causby was a
case that modified the ajus est solum maxim to accommodate the modern phenomenon of the
airplane. It is quite possible that the cujus est
solum maxim must be modified again to accommodate the modern advent of solar energy. See in/ra note 88 and the discussion of solar envelopes. After Causby, the dissent quoted from "the frequently cited and followed case of'
Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357, 359 (Fla. App.
1959), for an affirmation of the cajus est solum maxim and a rejection of the sic utere
maxim in
right to light cases. That opinion defined lawful rights as rights that have been in the past
protected by law. 114 So. 2d at 359. The definition begs the question of whether the law will
in the future protect additional rights to light. The Fontainebleaucourt was unable to find any
jurisdictions in the United States that granted protection for the right to light and so concluded that plaintiff's right to light enjoyed no protection. The plaintiff, therefore, had not
stated a laim upon which relief could be granted. Id The Prah majority pointed out that
the "statement that a landowner has no right to light should be the conclusion, not [the
court's] initial premise." 108 Wis. 2d at 239 n.13, 321 N.W.2d at 191 n.13. Fontainebleau,
because of its tautological reasoning, is not persuasive authority for the per se non-nuisance
conclusion.
83 In addition to the implicit attack on the majority's recognition of a nuisance, see supra
note 82, the dissent also argued that the facts of the case presented no cause of action. 108
Wis. 2d at 251-54, 256-57, 321 N.W.2d at 197-99. This Note will not address the dissent's
factual argument, except as it arises in connection with th.e suggested framework for adjudication. See infa notes 152-208 and accompanying text.
84
108 Wis. 2d at 250, 321 N.W.2d at 196 (Callow, J., dissenting).
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tionable invasions. 85 Under this test, courts dismiss nonphysically invasive conduct with a per se non-nuisance conclusion. 86 When a court
considers applying an established rule of thumb to a new situation, it
should not apply the rule unless the court first finds that the policies
underlying the rule apply to that new situation. 8 7 Similarly, when a
court confronts changes in an old context, it must relax an old rule of
thumb. 88
The majority in Prah v. Maretti identified three policies underlying
85

The Restatement Second defines private nuisance as "a nontrespassory invasion of an-

other's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTs § 821D (1979); cf W. PROSSER, supra note 7, § 89, at 244 ("Nuisance: the unwarranted doing of an act that interferes with another's enjoyment of property.") Justice Callow
equates the "invasion" in the Restatement Second formulation with physical invasion. Accord
Epstein, supra note 37, at 61 ("With the blocking of light, however, there can be no actionability under the invasion test.") (emphasis in original).
Assuming arguendo, that an "invasion" of some type is needed, as per the Restatement Second formulation, a physical invasion requirement cannot be read into the language of the
Restatement Second nuisance sections. Section 821E defines the scope of liability: "For a private
nuisance there is liability only to those who have property rights and privileges in respect to
the use and enjoyment of the land .... ." Comment a to § 821E amplifies this limitation:
"the liability. . . exists only for. . . persons having. . . legally protected property interests,
in respect to the particular use or enjoyment that has been affected." Finally, illustration I of
§ 829 demonstrates patently unreasonable conduct that gives rise to liability: "A 's sole purpose in building this fence is to annoy B by shutting out the light and view from his windows.
A's conduct is malicious and he is subject to liability to B." A's conduct only affects B's right
to light and view; there was no physical invasion. Because A is liable to B only for affecting
B's legally protected property interests, and A was indeed liable to B, then the property
interests that were affected must have been legally protected. Thus, the Restatement Second
provides nuisance protection against noninvasive conduct.
86 Cf. Epstein, supra note 37, at 60 ("[There are] a number of recurrent situations...
[with] an evident tension between the asserted nuisance and the physical-invasion test.").
Although Epstein defended non-nuisance treatment of nonphysically invasive nuisances, id
at 65, he admitted "the power of the theory [based on a physical invasion test] seems in all
cases to outstrip the capacity of the theory to command wholehearted allegiance." Id at 60.
87 The court in Prah v. Maretti quoted an earlier Wisconsin case:
Inherent in the common law is a dynamic principle which allows it to grow
and to tailor itself to meet changing needs within the doctrine of stare decisis,
which, if correctly understood, was not static and did not forever prevent the
courts from reversing themselves or from applying principles of common law
to new situations as the need arose.
108 Wis. 2d at 238 n.12, 321 N.W.2d at 190 n.12 (quoting Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 11,
114 N.W.2d 105, 110 (1962)).
88 See Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 735 (1949):
This search for a static security-in law or elsewhere-is misguided. The fact
is that security can only be achieved through constant change, through the
wise discarding of old ideas that have outlived their usefulness, and through
the adapting of others to current facts. There is only an illusion of safety in a
Maginot Line. Social forces like armies can sweep around a fixed position
and make it untenable.
Cf. Epstein, supra note 37, at 74 (willing to modify physical invasion test under certain circumstances where "utilitarian constraints" dictate). But see Rabin, supra note 11, at 1329-30
(physical invasion test should be abandoned completely because not helpful).
Both Justice Callow, in his dissent, and Epstein, in his article, argued that the modification of the physical invasion test in blockage-of-light as well as blockage-of-view cases would
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the per se non-nuisance conclusion in nineteenth century blockage-oflight cases: absolute dominion over property, low value placed on light,
and high value placed on unimpeded land development.8 9 All these
policies must be fully applicable to the solar access context 9° before the
dissent's physical invasion rule of thumb and per se analysis can be
properly extended to the new area of blocked solar access. Even if the
dissent is correct that these policies are not totally obsolete, 91 they are

not fully applicable in the solar access context. The court, therefore, was
correct in rejecting the physical invasion test.
First, courts considered the dominion of each landowner over his
property a fundamental freedom to be "jealously" guarded. 92 This freedom is still important, as the dissent points oUt, 93 but it is not as dominant as it once was. The landowner's autonomy has been seriously
restricted during the twentieth century. Among the most important of
these restrictions are zoning laws 94 and related legislation, 95 and the ex-

tensive powers exercised by quasi-governmental homeowner associahave a restrictive impact on all construction. See 108 Wis. 2d at 251, 321 N.W.2d at 196
(Callow, J., dissenting); Epstein, supra note 37, at 62.
This argument treats different land use interests, as though they were identical. Legislation, restrictive covenants, or judicial decisions, can create a definition for 'solar envelopes' in
each community, taking into consideration reasonable local expectations. Then, the invasion
necessary to state a nuisance claim would be an invasion of a neighbor's solar envelope, rather
than a mere blockage of light. This would be a redefinition of the cufus est solurn maxim
similar to the redefinition that accompanied the advent of the airplane. See United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946). In most communities, the solar envelope can dovetail with
zoning ordinances and local restrictive covenants. "Recent studies have shown that access to
sunlight is quite compatible with densities of development equal to at least 8 units per acre,
equivalent to the minimum area of most single family developments." Brief for the Natural
Resources Defense Council as Amicus Curiae at 15. With but a few exceptions, a lawfully
constructed building in a residential area will not obstruct a neighboring solar collector. Nor
is Prah v. Mareuti one of the exceptions. If Maretti had built at the grade approved by the
Architectural Control Board, there would have been no substantial interference with Prah's
solar collector. Brief for Appellant at 6-7.
89 108 Wis. 2d at 235, 321 N.W.2d at 189.
90 The Prah court did not explicitly limit its recognition of a cause of action to the solar
access context, though they focused on the new context. Id at 236, 321 N.W.2d at 189. This
Note focuses solely on the solar access context.
91 Id at 244, 321 N.W.2d at 193 (Callow, J., dissenting).
92 Id at 235, 321 N.W.2d at 189 ("First, the right of landowners to use their property as
they wished, as long as they did not cause physical damage to a neighbor, was jealously
guarded.').
93 Id at 245, 321 N.W.2d at 194 (Callow, J., dissenting) ("I firmly believe that a landowner's right to use his property within the limits of ordinances, statutes, and restrictions of
record where such use is necessary to serve his legitimate needs is a fundamental precept of a
free society which this court should strive to uphold.").
94 E.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-88 (1926). The extent
of zoning restrictions has become quite pervasive. E.g., State e-ret Stoyanoff v. Berkeley, 458
S.W.2d 305, 308 (Mo. 1970) (per curiam) (zoning ordinance regulating architectural styles is
valid).
95 E.g., People v. Goodman, 31 N.Y.2d 262, 290 N.E.2d 139, 338 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1972)
(conviction for violation of village sign ordinance affirmed).
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tions.96 Judicial enforcement of most restrictive covenants reinforces the
quasi-governmental power of homeowner associations. 9 7 The restrictions a typical homeowner association imposes far exceed in scope and
number the restrictive covenants that a court in the nineteenth century
would enforce when dominion over land was a fundamental freedom. 98
Autonomy over one's own land has been sacrificed to further collective
goals. Individual freedom over land, in its currently diminished form,
does not warrant a per se non-nuisance conclusion. 99
Second, courts and society in general did not consider the right to
receive sunlight to be terribly important after the advent of artificial
illumination, when compared with individual freedom over land and
unimpeded land development.10 0 Solar energy technology, however,
has changed the traditionally low value society assigned to the right to
receive sunlight.10 1 The majority in Prah v. Maretti acknowledged the
96 In the instant case, Lake Brittany Estates Architectural Control Board required each
homeowner to submit plans for their proposed residence, and had the power to require
changes in the design, such as requiring Maretti to move his home an additional 10 feet. See
supra note 48.
For a general view of the pervasiveness of homeowner associations see Reichman, Residential Private Governments.- An Introductoy Survq, 43 U. Ci-u. L. REv. 227 (1976). See also Hyatt,
Community Associations: How to Draft Documents that Work, 7 REAL EsT. LJ. 26 (1978); Scavo,
Dispute Resolution in a Communiy Association, 17 URBAN L. ANN. 309 (1979).
97 See Reichman,JdicialSupervision of Servitudes, 7 J. LEWAL STUD. 139 (1978).
98 Cf Reichman, supra note 96, at 269-70:
The modern attitude is to vest an almost unlimited discretion in an architectural control committee to pass upon building plans. The committee is usually empowered not only to decide whether the proposed house is
"harmonious" with the neighborhood, but also to review minor details [such
as, paint, materials, awning design, etc.].
See also Stoebuck, Running Covenants: An Analytical Primer, 52 WASH. L. REV. 861, 885-86
(1977) (footnotes omitted):
The traditional view has been that courts should not favor the existence of
real covenants, especially [on] the burden side. At bottom was the general
policy against encumbrances on land titles. . . . Requirements of horizontal
privity are the leading example. In England, the burden is permitted to run
only when the covenant was made between landlord and tenant. New York's
old rule against the running of affirmative duties was another example of the
antagonistic policy. So was the older concept that covenants had to touch
and concern the land in a physical sense.
99 108 Wis. 2d at 237, 321 N.W.2d at 190.
100
108 Wis. 2d at 235, 321 N.W.2d at 189 ("[S]unlight was valued only for aesthetic
enjoyment or as illumination. Since artificial light could be used for illumination, loss of
sunlight was at most a personal annoyance which was given little, if any, weight by society.");
accord Note, supra note 4, at 364 ("American courts have refused to recognize a nuisance
action on the policy ground that the need for construction takes precedence over the right to
light.").
101 E.g., Note, supra note 4, at 390 ("The law, in response to the contemporary economic
order, must recognize a right to solar access for use as an alternative energy resource."); accord
Brief for Natural Resources Defense Council as Amicus Curiae at 8-9 (citations omitted):
The use of solar energy for heating, particularly water heating, is already
competitive with alternative fuels in many parts of the country when judged
by traditional measures of return on investment. ...
Where solar energy can help reduce the need fdr'new power plants, the
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"new significance in recent years [ofJ access to sunlight."' 10 2
The dissent attacked this assertion by questioning the value of solar
energy, but this attack is flawed. The dissent attributed the sparing use
of solar energy systems to high costs. These high costs are allegedly due
to the lack of mass production, which, in turn, results from the systems'
limited efficiency. 10 3 Another factor in the high cost of solar energy systems, which the dissent apparently neglected, is the risk that a neighbor
will obstruct a collector.10 4 This hidden cost may also appear in the
form of a purchased easement of light, or through the implicit cost of
agreeing to a set of restrictive covenants.t0 5 The courts and legislatures

potential economic benefits to society are much greater, although traditional
electricity rate structures do not pass on these savings to those who install the
systems ...
While solar energy systems are thus at least competitive now in many
places (without reference to environmental benefits and other social advantages that are not easily quantified), solar systems will become economically
preferable over the next ten years.
see also supra note 1 and accompanying text; see also authorities cited supra note 4.
102
108 Wis. 2d at 236, 321 N.W.2d at 189. The Wisconsin legislature has also recognized
the importance of sunlight for solar energy:
(a) Diminishing supplies of nonrenewable energy resources threaten the
physical and economic well-being of the citizens of this state who presently
rely on such resources to maintain their homes, industries, businesses and institutions.
(b) Solar energy systems hold great promise for the future energy needs
of this state because they use a renewable energy resource; because they require less capital, land, water and other resources needed for central-station
generation of electricity; and because they do not pollute the state's water and
air.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.031 (West Supp. 1983).
103 108 Wis. 2d at 247, 321 N.W.2d at 194 (Callow, J., dissenting) ("limited efficiency
may explain lack of production").
104 Brief for Natural Resources Defense Council as Amicus Curiae at 4 ("Legal and institutional issues rank with economic considerations as major barriers to the utilization of solar
energy technologies. . . . Even a few instances of investments in solar energy lost due to
shading could very adversely affect the industry because of the uncertainty likely to be created in consumers' minds.") (citations omitted).
This hidden cost was explicitly recognized by the legislature in Wisconsin. WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 66.031 (West Supp. 1983) ("The unsettled state of the law regarding the right to use
of sunlight discourages capital investment in solar energy systems and impedes production of
economically accessible solar energy hardware. . . . Unless the law on solar access rights is
clarified, the use of solar energy systems will remain limited.").
105 Neither a purchased easement nor a restrictive convenant will avoid problems. The
purchased easement may not be enforceable by the solar energy user if a court treats the
easement as a novel negative easement rather than an extension of the permissible express
negative easement for light. Cf D. DONAHuE, T. KAUPER & P. MARTIN, supra note 14, at
1039. In addition, a solar easement may not be enforceable by the current solar energy user
against his current neighbor. It is possible that a court would find a solar easement to be in
gross, rather than appurtenant. E.g., Shia v. Pendergrass, 222 S.C. 342, 72 S.E.2d 699 (1952)
(right of way in gross, as it did not reach the easement owner's property). Recent legislation
specifically recognizing solar easements indicates prior doubt concerning the extent and the
enforceability of such easements. E.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.031 (West Supp. 1983) ("Re-
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have been slow to afford full protection against these hidden costs. 10 6
Thus, the sparing use of solar collectors may be attributed partly to the
lack of judicial or legislative protection, rather than only to a lack of
efficiency.
Third, nineteenth century society considered unimpeded land development important for the full utilization of resources in order to produce the prosperity expected from the industrial revolution. 10 7 Both the
majority'0 8 and the dissent' 0 9 recognized that the value of unimpeded
land development had diminished in response to an increased societal
interest in aesthetics. Justice Callow argued, however, that unimpeded
land development had only yielded to aesthetics for the public welfare,
not for purely private benefit. 110 Even granting this, Justice Callow's
conclusion that unimpeded land development should not yield for private benefit"' does not inexorably follow. Rather, the concession that
this policy has yielded at all demonstrates its currently waning value.
newable energy resource easements shall run with the land benefitted and burdened unless
otherwise expressly stated therein.").
Restrictive convenants, although far more enforceable today than they were in the nineteenth century, see supra note 98, often do not accomplish the intentions of the drafters. Eg.,
Sleepy Creek Club, Inc. v. Lawrence, 29 N.C. App. 547, 222 S.E.2d 167, cert. denied, 290 N.C.
659, 222 S.E.2d 167 (1976). The court held the restrictive covenants unenforceable by the
homeowner's association because the homeowner's association was a stranger to the chain of
title at the time of the insertion of the restriction, and the deed did not include a grant of the
right to sue to the plaintiffs. The principle of Sleepy Creek Club would apply when an established subdivision votes to impose restrictive convenants against obstructing solar collectors of
neighbors, but stumbles over one of the property law hurdles.
106 See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
107
108 Wis. 2d at 235, 321 N.W.2d at 189 ("Third, society had a significant interest in
not restricting or impeding land development . . . [and] recognition of a right to sunlight
would hinder [such] development.').
108 Id. at 237, 321 N.W.2d at 190 ("The need for easy and rapid development is not as
great today as it once was . .
").
109 Id at 247, 321 N.W.2d at 194 (Callow, J., dissenting) ("I concede the law may be
tending to recognize the value of aesthetics over increased volume development. . . .'). But
see id., 321 N.W.2d at 195 ("I note that this court in [State v. Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d 1, 224 N.W.2d
407 (1974)] stated: 'The reasonable use rule retains. . . a policy of favoring land improvement and development.' [66 Wis. 2d] at 20.").
t10 108 Wis. 2d at 247, 321 N.W.2d at 194-95 (Callow, J., dissenting) ("[A]n individual
may not use his land in such a way as to harm the public. The instant case, however, deals
with aprivate benefit.") (emphasis in original).
11I Id, 321 N.W.2d at 195 ("While the majority's policy arguments may be directed to a
cause of action for public nuisance, we are presented with a private nuisance case which I
believe is distinguishable in this regard.') (footnote omitted); see also id at 246, 321 N.W.2d at
194 ("The cases involving the use of police power and eminent domain are clearly distinguishable from the present situation as they relate to interference with a private right solely
for thepublic health, safety, morals or welfare.') (emphasis in original). But see supra note 7
(discussion of unclear division between public and private nuisance); see also Note, supra note
1, at 454 (recognition of private nuisance will lead to recognition of public nuisance). See
generall.y WIs. STAT. ANN. § 66.031 (West Supp. 1983) (quoted supra note 102). The Wisconsin legislature apparently believes that the protection of solar access is a public benefit, as well
as a private benefit. Cf Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-88 (1926)
(nuisance law provides helpful analogies for determining reasonableness of zoning laws); infra
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The policies that justified the use of a physical-invasion rule of
thumb in blockage-of-light cases are "no longer 'in harmony with the
realities of our society,' "1112 especially in solar access nuisance cases. The
majority in Prah v. Mare/li refused to extend the per se non-nuisance
conclusion to the solar access nuisance dispute.' 13 They correctly recognized a cause of action and remanded for a full trial.
B.

An Alternative Framework for Resolution Suggested
With a cause of action recognized, courts should resolve solar access
disputes through a framework that has "the flexibility to protect both a
landowner's right of access to sunlight and another landowner's right to
develop land;" 1 4 one that is both efficient and fair.1 15 "[TIhe most efficient [result] achieve[s] the greatest gain in value [of the properties involved] at the least expense. By definition, any other [result] would
waste resources."' 1 6 The fair result imposes the costs of the conflict on
17
the blameworthy party.
notes 194-96 and accompanying text (discussion of public and private benefits in eminent
domain context).
112
108 Wis. 2d at 238, 321 N.W.2d at 190 (quoting State v. Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d 1, 15, 224
N.W.2d 407, 414 (1974)).
113
The juxtaposition of the values society places on unimpeded land development and
sunlight indicates a need for a reevaluation of the per se conclusion. A per se conclusion of
noi.-nuisance is appropriate in a situation where the "interest" injured will never be found
more important than the conduct that causes the injury. According to many courts, including
those in Wisconsin, the right to light used to be subservient to any beneficial land use, see
supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. The per se conclusion, however, is no longer warranted because now the interest interfered with may be more important than the interfering
conduct. 108 Wis. 2d at 237, 321 N.W.2d at 190. "'What is regarded in law as constituting a
nuisance in modem times would no doubt have been tolerated without question in former
times.'" 108 Wis. 2d at 237, 321 N.W.2d at 190 (quoting Ballstadt v. Pagel, 202 Wis. 484,
489, 232 N.W. 862, 864 (1930)).
114
108 Wis. 2d at 239, 321 N.W.2d at 191.
115 Rabin, supra note 11, at 1309 ("If decisionmaking could promote both fairness and
efficiency, society, through the legislature and the courts, would not need to choose between
fairness and utility as the ultimate goal."); see infra notes 138-50 and accompanying text.
116 Rabin, supra note 11, at 1304; accord Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 37, at 1093;
Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The imple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32
STAN. L. REV. 1075, 1081 (1980).
117 Rabin, supra note 11, at 1304; cf. Polinsky, supra note 116, at 1083-84 ("The second
potentially important concern in any nuisance dispute is distributional equity."). But cf Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 37, at 1118 (prescribing rule based on ability of parties to
reduce or avoid cost of conflict). Calabresi and Melamed look to societal preference for bearing the cost, in the sense of a redistribution of wealth, rather than fairness based on fault. See
also R. POSNER, ECONOMic ANALYSIS OF LAW 16-31 (1977) (liability assigned only on economic grounds); accord Note, supra note 4, at 365-68 (applying Calabresi and Melamed "set of
principles governing nuisance actions," generally placing cost of solution on wealthier party).
Rabin, supra note 11, at 1314-15, after recognizing that transaction costs always exist, see infra
notes 140-45 and accompanying text, argued that the Calabresi and Melamed analysis "confuses questions of efficiency with those of fairness."
In the framework presented below, the Calabresi and Melamed notions of distributional
preference by society are encompassed by the efficiency criteria, see infia notes 171-74 and
accompanying text.
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The court in Prah v. Maretti rejected the formal tort approach, a per
se non-nuisance conclusion, and chose the Restatement (Second) of
Torts nuisance framework.1 18 This section of the Note will recommend
adoption of a land use framework'19 that focuses on blame and effi-

ciency in two separate stages 120 before resolving solar access disputes.121
1. The Problem with the Restatement (Second) of Torts Approach
Solar access disputes differ from typical tort cases because of the
effect the court's decision may have on the parties. In a typical tort case,
the physical damage has occurred before the case comes to trial. The
judge and jury will assign blame and award monetary damages, but will
not alter the physical damage. In solar access disputes, however, the
physical damage usually will not have occurred when a party brings
suit. Although a claim for past injuries may be included, 122 the plaintiff's primary demand will be for an injunction, 123 giving the court complete control of the physical result. The court's disposition of the case
will require action by the parties that is damaging to one of the parties.
118 108 Wis. 2d at 239-40, 321 N.W.2d at 190-9 1.
119 See infra notes 149-50 and accompanying text (format and definitions).
120 See infra notes 152-65 (blame), 166-76 (efficiency) and accompanying text.
t21 See infra notes 176-208 and accompanying text. Solar access nuisance disputes may
also be framed inversely to the one in Prah . Marelli The proposed framework would apply if
Maretti had sued Prah because Prah's solar collector restricted Maretti's use and enjoyment
of his land beyond the applicable covenants and zoning restrictions. In his dissent, Justice
Callow noted this possible reversal:
[I] wonder if we are examining the proper nuisance in the case before us. In
other words, could it be said that the solar energy user is creating the nuisance
when others must conform their homes to accommodate his use? I note that
solar panel glare may . . . reflect into adjacent buildings causing excessive
heat, and otherwise irritate neighbors. Certainly in these instances the solar
heating system constitutes the nuisance.
108 Wis. 2d at 248 n.3, 321 N.W.2d at 195 n.3. Justice Callow's footnote points up the importance of a framework for nuisance dispute resolution that does not presuppose only one possible "nuisancee" and "nuisancer." See injfa notes 138-39, 152 and accompanying text.
In a recent Wyoming suit, a landowner charged that his neighbor's solar collectors reflected light and heat against the rear of his house to the south, thus causing a public and
private nuisance and constituting a trespass as well as a breach of a restrictive covenant.
Hinkley v. Black, No. 4823 (Teton County Ct., Wyo. 1981) (reported in Couple Sues Neighbor
over Collector Glare, 3 SOLAR L. REP. 212 (1981)).
122 Eg., Prah v. Maretti, 108 Wis. 2d 223, 321 N.W.2d 182 (1982). In Prahv. Maretti the
plaintiff sued for damages as well as an injunction. According to the evidence and court
papers, the parties had not incurred any costs due to damage, but they had incurred legal
fees. Because Prah filed the case before Maretti obstructed the solar collector, Maretti's acts
only posed the threat of a "nuisance."
123 The capacity to sue for both damages and an injunction is relatively new in nuisance
law. Abatement acted as the sole civil remedy for the assize of nuisance. J. BAKER, supra note
17, at 351. When the assize of nuisance gave way to nuisance as a branch of "case," see supra
note 18, damages became the sole remedy; a plaintiff could also sue in equity to secure an
injunction, but it was a separate and risky procedure. E.g., Bury v. Pope, I Cro. Eliz. 118, 78
Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. 1586). With the merger of law and equity in the late nineteenth century,
plaintiffs finally could sue for both damages and injunctive relief in a single proceeding.
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If, for example, in Prah v. Marettz, the judge finds Maretti blameworthy
and issues the injunction, then Maretti must redesign his house.124 Or,
if the judge finds Prah at fault and dismisses the suit, then Prah must
abandon or rebuild his solar collector.125 Unlike a typical tort case, the
physical result in a solar access dispute will wait to be determined until
the judge disposes of the case.
The Restatement Second nuisance framework begins with an analysis
of the defendant's reasonableness.1 26 For example, in Prah v. Maretti, if
the utility of Maretti's obstruction outweighs the gravity of the harm it
27
causes Prah's solar energy system, then Maretti acted reasonably.
124 Accord Note, An Economic Anaysis of Land Use Conflicts, 21 STAN. L. REV. 293, 297
(1969) ("Regardless of the approach it takes, the legal system will always answer these questions in one fashion or another.").
An injunction will enable Prah to bring to bear the power of the state if Maretti continues his construction. To avoid being subject to the discipline of the state, Maretti will
"choose" to modify his proposed chimney. See alro Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 37, at
1091.
125 A dismissal of the case enables Maretti to proceed with his construction with no fear
that Prah will bring the power of the state to bear against him. If Prah's fears of a freeze-up
in his solar panels are genuine, see supra note 47, then he will "choose" to modify his solar
collector system, rather than risk damaging his home. See also Calabresi & Melamed, supra
note 37, at 1091.
126 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1979) provides the general rules governing liability. The defendant's conduct must be intentional and unreasonable; unintentional but actionable as negligence; or strictly liable as a dangerous activity. Almost all
nuisance claims fall within the first category. Whether the "invasion" involved intent is
rarely in question. Maretti, for example, began construction knowing that his proposed house
would "invade" Prah's alleged rights. Because the issue of intent usually is resolved quickly,
the bulk of the Restatement Second analysis falls on the issue of unreasonableness.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826(a) (1979) entitled "Unreasonableness of Intentional Invasion" provides: "An intentional invasion of another's interest in the use and
enjoyment of land is unreasonable if. . . the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the
actor's conduct ....
Section 827 of the Restatement Second details the factors involved in determining the gravity of the harm:
(a) The extent of the harm involved;
(b) the character of the harm involved;
(c) the social value that the law attaches to the type of use or enjoyment
invaded;
(d) the suitability of the particular use or enjoyment invaded to the character
of the locality; and
(e) the burden on the person harmed of avoiding the harm.
Section 828 of the Restatement Second details the factors involved in determining the utility
of the defendant's conduct:
(a) the social value that the law attaches to the primary purpose of the
conduct;
(b) the suitability of the conduct to the character of the locality; and
(c) the impracticability of preventing or avoiding the invasion.
The two sections differ in one respect. The gravity of the harm checklist includes factors (a)
and (b) as a threshold test to determine if the harm is de minimis.
127 Prah v. Mareli is a good case to illustrate the inadequacies of the Restatement Second
framework and the advantages of the land use framework. First, Prah v. Maretti was the first
solar access nuisance dispute to reach an appellate court. It has a well developed set of facts,
which are useful to illustrate the workings of the suggested framework. Second, Prah v. Maretti
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Absent patent unreasonableness, such as pure malice, t28 unlawfulness,1 29 or unsuitability to the location, 130 this determination will often
hinge upon whom the court deems more blameworthy for creating the
conflict. 131 If the court finds Prah more blameworthy, it will dismiss the
case. 132 On the other hand, if the court finds Maretti more blameworthy, Maretti will be subject at least to damages and possibly to an
injunction.133

If the court finds that Maretti is more blameworthy and that a
damage award would not adequately compensate Prah, it will grant an
injunction. 34 In some instances, "adequate" will be synonomous with
may well be a typical solar access nuisance case. It involved neither egregious activities nor
patently unreasonable parties-factors that make nuisance cases easy to decide. Rather Prah
v.Marettd involved generally reasonable suburbanites. Because the situation in Prah v.Afaretd
appears to be typical, the suggested approach in this Note differs from a similar discussion in
Note, supra note 4, at 364-67. In that Note, the author discussed a set of principles governing
nuisance actions in cases involving egregious conduct or dissimilarly situated parties. For the
residual category of similarly situated parties, the author offered one solution: splitting the
costs of adjustment. This Note focuses on similarly situated parties-the hardest categoryand the most likely category for solar access nuisance disputes.
128

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 829(a) (1979) provides that "[a]n intentional

invasion of another's interest in the use and enjoyment of land is unreasonable if the harm is
significant and the actor's conduct is. . .for the sole purpose of causing harm to the other
. Section 829 illustrates its subsection (a) with a spite fence example. Id. illustration 1.
129 Id § 829(b) (invasion "unreasonable if the harm is significant and the actor's conduct
is . . .contrary to common standards of decency"). Section 829, comment d, notes that
"[c]ertain types of indecent conduct are illegal . ..."
130 See id § 829(b). Section 829, comment d, explains that "many types of conduct...
have a definite social value when carried on with circumspection, but . . . contravene the
commonly accepted standards of decency when not so carried on."
131 With a significant harm, Restatement Second §§ 827 and 828 weigh three elements: the
value of each activity, the suitability of each activity to the location, and the ability to have
prevented or ameliorated the harm. Society encourages home ownership and solar energy
use. Similarly, in a subdivision such as Lake Brittany Estates, neither owning a home nor
using a solar energy system is unsuitable. Thus, in this typical case, the Restatement Second
formulation would normally determine whether the defendant had acted unreasonably based
on which party could have prevented the conflict most easily.
132 See id § 827 comment (e); see also id § 941 comment c: "A satisfactory technique for
dealing with an action to restrain an alleged nuisance must embrace at least three possible
solutions: (1) holding that there is no tort, and that the plaintiff must bear the harm in
question as an incident of group life, without redress of any kind .... "
133 Id § 821F comment b (1979) ("[A] private nuisance may be enjoined because harm is
threatened that would be significant if it occurred, and that would make the nuisance actionable under the rule here stated, although no harm has yet resulted."). Sections 933-51 deal
with injunctions. Sections 933-43 test for the appropriateness of an injunction and §§ 944-51
compare the relative adequacy of other remedies to injunctions. The nuisance chapter,
§§ 821A-840E, contains no independent tests for injunctions and deals primarily with damage remedies.
134 See id § 933(1) ("The availability of an injunction against a committed or threatened
tort depends upon the appropriateness of this remedy as determined by a comparative appraisal of factors listed in § 936.").
Restatement Second § 936 lists the following factors to determine the appropriateness of
granting an injunction:
(a) the nature of the interest to be protected,
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"efficient."' 3 5 Yet, in other instances, the court may deny an "efficient"
injunction because the damage award is "adequate," or grant an "inefficient" injunction because the damage award is "inadequate. 1' 36 An injunction imposes a specific result; Maretti must modify his house. A
damage award allows Prah to bargain with Maretti over which result to
adopt.

The Restatement Second framework does not focus the court's attention on the "efficient" result when the court dismisses a case because the
plaintiff is at fault,13 7 or when the court finds that damages provide the
plaintiff an "adequate" remedy.138 When the constraints of the Restate-

ment Second framework would produce a grossly inefficient result, a court
may sacrifice fairness and grant the efficient result, blame notwithstanding.' 3 9 Because the result reached using the Restatement Second framework may be inefficient or unfair, that framework is inappropriate for
resolving solar access disputes.
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

the relative adequacy to the plaintiff of injunction and of other remedies,
[laches]
[unclean hands]
the relative hardship likely to result to defendant if an injunction is
granted and to plaintiff if it is denied,
(0 the interests of third persons and of the public, and
(g) the practicability of framing and enforcing the order or judgment.
In the typical solar access dispute, establishment of a nuisance with the Restatement Second
formulation is likely to leave unresolved only factor (b), the relative adequacy of damages.
135 See id § 941(c) (having balanced conflicting interests to determine if there is nuisance,
court must balance interests again to prevent extortionate behavior by plaintiff if court enters
injunction). See also id § 938 comment b ("In determining the appropriateness of injunction
as a remedy, it may sometimes be found that an injunction provides relief that is more than
adequate, and that affords too much protection.").
136 See id § 941 ("The relative hardship likely to result to the defendant if an injunction
is granted and to the plaintiff if it is denied, is one of the factors to be considered in determining the appropriateness of injunction against tort."). But see id comment c (the warning of
extortionate behavior evidences concern for efficiency).
137 See id (one solution is "holding that there is no tort, and that the plaintiff must bear
the harm in question as an incident of group life, without redress of any kind"). Under this
solution, no opportunity exists to review efficiency in a typical solar access case because the
court would find no tort based on the initial inquiry into reasonableness. See supra note 131
and accompanying text.
138 See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
139 See, e.g., Pendolay v. Ferreria, 345 Mass. 309, 187 N.E.2d 142 (1963). In that case, the
court, while not explicitly applying the Restatement Second framework, found the defendant was
reasonable in running a pig farm, but enjoined the farm's operation because it was a "nuisance" to suburbanites who had arrived in the vicinity several years after the defendant established his farm. The court did not require or permit the defendant to pay damages to his
neighbors for the inconvenience.
The court could have found that the plaintiffs acted unreasonably for having moved to
the vicinity of an existing "nuisance," which, incidentally, probably enabled them to
purchase their land at a lower cost. Under the Restatement Second approach, the court should
have dismissed the case. Under the land use framework suggested infia at notes 150-211 and
accompanying text, the court would grant the plaintiffs a "purchased" injunction. See Spur
Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972); infia notes 197-207
and accompanying text.
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The Restatement Second framework might produce efficient results if
the free market view of the "Coase theorem" 140 applies. "Coase theorem" analysis holds that regardless of initial legal entitlements, the parties will negotiate an efficient allocation of resources. If, for example, it
would be more efficient to scrap Prah's solar collector, but the court
enjoined Maretti from building his house as planned, Maretti would
pay Prah to abandon the collector.
The "Coase theorem," however, "does not imply that the policy
maker need not be concerned about how rights are assigned." 141 Three
primary reasons ultimately prevent the "Coase theorem" free market
view from providing fair and efficient results in most solar access disputes. First, Coase posited "a world, admittedly unrealistic, in which
parties to a nuisance dispute bargain cooperatively. . . , income redistribution is costless, and. courts have perfect information."' 14 2 Yet, as
43
many commentators have pointed out, transaction costs always exist.
Second, Coase intentionally ignored fairness in his formulation to
demonstrate that absent transaction costs, the free market will create
efficient results.' Third, even accepting the "Coase theorem" conclusion that bargaining will reach an efficient result, it "would not mean
. . . that the same allocation of resources would exist regardless of the
initial set of entitlements." 145 For these reasons, the free market's capacity to eliminate the unfairness or inefficiencies created by the Restatement
Second framework in solar access disputes is doubtful.
2.

The Land Use Solution

Nuisance law, originally a branch of property law, can be administered under a land use, rather than tort, framework. Building on the
48
47
work of Calabresi and Melamed, 146 Ellickson,1 and Michelman,
140 See Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960); Ellickson, supra note
37, at 722-23; cf Rabin, supra note 11, at 1313-16 ("Coase proved a rather technical and
narrow economic point: that whatever the initial assignment of entitlements, efficiency
would not be adversely affected in a world without transaction costs.").
141 Ellickson, supra note 37, at 723; see also Coase, supra note 140, at 15.
142 Polinsky, supra note 116, at 1088 (footnote omitted); see Calabresi & Melamed, supra
note 37, at 1094-95 ("'[N]o transaction costs' must be understood extremely broadly as involving both perfect knowledge and the absence of any impediments or costs of negotiating.')
(emphasis added); Ellickson, supra note 37, at 722-24; Rabin, supra note 11, at 1316; Regan,
The Problem of Social Cost Revisited, 15 J. LAW & ECON. 427, 428-32 (1972).
143 See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 11, at 1313.
144 See Coase, supra note 140, at 15; Rabin, supra note 11, at 1315-16.
145
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 37, at 1095.
"[W]hat is a Pareto optimal, or economically efficient solution [from bargaining] varies
with the starting distribution. . . . [As] transaction costs become important, the goal of economic efficiency starts to prefer one allocation of entitlements over another." Id at 1096.
146 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 37.
147 See Ellickson, supra note 37.
148 See Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the EthicalFoundationsof yust
Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165 (1967).
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Professor Rabin1 49 suggested a land use framework for resolving nuisance disputes. Rabin's framework evaluates fairness and efficiency separately and then combines them to produce the optimal disposition of
each case. 150 Although Rabin argued for the abandonment of the physical invasion test,1 51 he illustrated his land use framework with a physically invasive nuisance, a polluting factory. 52 Nevertheless, a court can
adopt a land use framework to produce fair and efficient results in
nonphysically invasive nuisance cases, such as those involving ob153
structed solar collectors.
A land use framework, 154 evaluating blameworthiness and fairness
149
See Rabin, supra note 11. "[T]his article expands upon a suggestion first made by
Professors Calabresi and Melamed ....
" Id at 1347. "Professor Ellickson['s] outstanding
article. . . has strongly influenced this one. . . ." Id at 1339. "Although Michelman used
the [utility, fairness, and efficiency] criteria in the police power context, they can shed light on
nuisance law as well. In applying them to nuisance law, I believe that existing law can and
should be modified to satisfy these criteria more fully." Id at 1303 (footnote omitted).
150
See Rabin, supra note 11, at 1309-12.
The procedure here proposed for resolving private nuisance cases involves two steps. The first step would be to determine who is morally more
blameworthy for the existence of the conflict. That person should bear the
cost of resolving the conflict. This should satisfy the fairness criterion. ["Generally the current methods of assigning fault are satisfactory." Id at 1309
n.30.] The second step in the proposed procedure would be to determine how
the conflict can be resolved with least expense. This resolution of the conflict
would satisfy the efficiency criterion. As a result, the person at fault would
pay the cost of resolving the conflict caused by the nuisance in the most efficient manner. This result would be both fair and efficient.
Id at 1309 (footnotes omitted).
151 Rabin argues that the physical invasion test is both over and under inclusive. See id
at 1329-30.
152 Rabin explains "fault" as illustrated by a polluting factory:
In a conflict between two landowners, each legitimately can be seen as
causing the conflict. The homeowner's insistence on being free from the
smoke of a factory is as much a cause of the conflict as the factory owner's
insistence on running a factory that produces smoke. While both thus can be
said to have caused the conflict, this does not mean that both are equally at
fault, or that neither is at fault.
Id at 1316. In rejecting the physical invasion argument, Rabin again used the polluting
factory:
As between the polluter and his neighbor we often are tempted to assume
that the polluter must be at fault. That the polluter is annoying his neighbor,
not vice versa, is the initial reaction of many. Yet if the injunction is granted,
the neighbor will be "annoying" the polluter. A priori, there is no reason to
prefer one landowner to the other.
Id at 1329 (footnote omitted).
153
See supra note 85 and accompanying text (discussion of physical invasion test).
154
The land use framework is illustrated below. The term "land use" has been popular
in academic literature for many years. E.g., Comment, supra note 64:
But this does not imply that the interests of individuals should be ignored in
the total system of land use controls. Those interests are as important as the
public's interests, even though public law systems may be inappropriate for
protecting them. It is at this juncture thatprivalenuisance can be introduced as
an important mode of land use control. Individual landowners who suffer
unreasonable interference from a land use which is acceptable to the public
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in separate stages before fashioning an appropriate remedy, will not sacrifice fairness or efficiency. This framework will meet the criteria set by
the Prah court for resolving solar access disputes: "the flexibility to protect both a landowner's right of access to sunlight and another landowner's right to develop land" 155 and "promote the reasonable use and
enjoyment of land in a manner suitable to the 1980's."i156 The facts
developed in Prah v. Maretti will illustrate the framework's mechanics in
the solar access context.
a. Blameworthiness. Under the first stage of the land use framework, the court assesses the reasonableness of both parties' behavior.
Absent any patent unreasonableness, the party that should have
157
avoided the conflict is to blame.
Several factors point to Prah as the "cause" of the conflict. First, he
built to the south of center on his lot.' 58 Second, he did not have an
express easement of light over Maretti's lot.159 Third, Prah installed a
may bring actions for private nuisance to secure remedies appropriate to them
as individuals.
In many land use disputes, damages are appropriate but preventive remedies are not.
Id at 53 (emphasis in original); accord Ellickson, supra note 37; Note, supra note 124.
155 Prah v. Maretti, 108 Wis. 2d at 239, 321 N.W.2d at 191.
156 Id at 240, 321 N.W.2d at 191.
157 This evaluation of blameworthiness is the same as the evaluation of unreasonableness
under the Restatement Second formulation. See Rabin, supra note 11, at 1309 n.30. Rabin explains: "The question of who should pay can be answered only with reference to the criterion
of fairness, involving an assessment of relative moral fault." Id. at 1309.
Rabin concludes:
Fault in this context is the result of many factors that cannot easily be summarized. The person who produces the interference is not necessarily, or even
usually, at fault. And for purposes of assigning fault it should be immaterial
who first owned property in the area. Rather, the relevant, but not necessarily determinative, question should be "On which property was the use first
begun that subsequently proved incompatible with the use of neighboring
property?"
d at 1346-47; see also Note, supra note 124, at 314 (use that emits externality is equivalent to
use that is sensitive to that externality).
158 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
Prah claimed that Maretti's house would not block his solar collector if it was five feet
further to the south. In assigning fault, one might also ask whether the conflict would have
been foreclosed had Prah initially built five feet further north. "The circuit court also concluded that the plaintiff could have avoided any harm by locating his own house in a better
place. . . . [P]ilaintiffs ability to avoid the harm is a relevant but not a conclusive factor."
108 Wis. 2d at 242, 321 N.W.2d 192. Butseeid at 256 n.8, 321 N.W.2d at 199 n.8 (Callow, J.,
dissenting) ("Mr. Prah could have avoided this litigation by building his home in the center
of his lot instead of only ten feet from the Maretti lot line. . . ."). Prah's location may have
been off-center to comply with elevation or zoning requirements.
159
The dissent in Prah mentions this argument: "Property law encompasses a system of
filing and notice in a place of public records to provide prospective purchasers with any
limitations on their use of the property. Such a notice is not alleged by the plaintiff." 108
Wis. 2d at 254, 321 N.W.2d at 198; see also Brief for Respondent at 35 ("[Plaintiff] could have
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1 60
solar collector that was too prone to freeze-ups.
On the other hand, several factors indicate that Maretti might be
the "cause" of the conflict. First, he insisted upon building as close to
Prah's lot as the Board would approve.1 6 1 Second, he allowed the elevation to be approved at 787.5 feet, rather than 785.5 feet, although he
could have sought a variance.162 Third, Maretti insisted on placing his
163
chimney on the north side of his house.
The court could assign blame on these facts to Prah, to Maretti, to
both, 64 or to a third party.165 No matter what the court determines in
this first stage, the court must proceed to the next stage: evaluation of
the efficiency of possible resolutions.

b. E'ffciengy. In contrast to the analysis in the Restatement Second,
the second stage of the land use framework is reached in every case and
focuses on the physical results of the conflict, for example, moving the
location of Maretti's chimney, rather than on remedies, such as a temporary injunction. The court will focus on the remedy only after separately evaluating blameworthiness and efficiency.
The pleadings and testimony will often narrow the spectrum of posfurther protected himself by procuring a solar easement from Defendant-Respondent's
predecesor [sic] in title.
...
). But see supra note 72 (discussion of verbal agreement between
Maretti's predecessor and Prah.)
160 Brief for Respondent at 35 ("Plaintiff-Appellant had no right to assume that his system would be operable indefinitely. . . .[He] came into court without previously investigating whether or not there were any technological innovations or remedial measures available
in the solar energy field to help him eliminate the problems .... ").But see Brief for Natural
Resources Defense Council as Amicus Curiae at 3 ("Plaintiff-appellant Glenn Prah built his
home and solar heating system with expert assistance . .
").
161 See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text; cf. Brief for Appellant at A-10 (letter
from Glenn Prah to Architectural Control Committee, Record at 7-8) ("Mr. Maretti has
indicated that the off center position is necessary to meet all set backs."). Maretti also mentioned maximizing his view of Lake Brittany.
162 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
163 See supra note 62 and accompanying text. Maretti claimed that Prah did not ask him
to move his chimney until after he began construction. Brief for Respondent at 26-27.
Maretti admitted, however, that it was "obvious that both of the parties were aware of the
fact that the chimney of Defendant Respondent's [sic] home would be a factor in contributing
to the alleged shadowing . . . particularly since the chimney was shown on the plans and
specifications originally submitted by Defendant-Respondent. . . ." Id Maretti's placement
may have been dictated by his need for an unobstructed southern roof for his own solar
collector. Id at 35.
164 In Note, supra note 124, at 314, the author suggests that when the parties are equally
to blame, the court should make them split the costs.
165 If the blame falls on a third party, and that party is brought into the suit, the claim
against the third party would probably not be a nuisance suit. In Prah V. Marett, the court
might have determined that the "blame" was assignable to Maretti's predecessor in title, who
may have failed to inform Maretti of his verbal agreement with Prah. Or, the Lake Brittany
Estates Architectural Control Board may have been blameworthy for failing to require
Maretti to bring his City of Muskego approved plans back to the Board. Further, the Board
may have been blameworthy for having allowed Prah to build so close to his southern lot line,
if they were not prepared to ensure him proper free space to the south.
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sible physical results to a few alternatives. In Prah v. Maretth, Prah's solar
expert testified that the problems anticipated by the construction of
Maretti's house would have been solved if Maretti had placed his chimney on any other wall of his house. 166 Maretti suggested that Prah alleviate his solar collector problems with "technological innovations or
remedial measures. . . such as the use of reflectors." 167 The parties narrowed the court's choice to only two results. 6 Using the Restatement Second framework, the court would grant one of these results by focusing
on remedies, 169 without specifically addressing the issue of efficiency. Using the land use framework, the court will evaluate the relative efficiency of these two results, or any result the court develops sua sponte,
before proceeding to the remedy stage.
Evaluating the efficiency of potential results to a land use conflict
requires the court to pose this hypothetical question: "If I now owned
both properties and had society's preferences, which resolution would I
adopt?"'170 The court will need to address three major factors to answer
this question: aggregate land value, gain or loss according to societal
preferences, and out-of-pocket costs.
To determine the first factor, aggregate land value, the court must
evaluate the gain or loss in fair market value for each property under
each result, absent other societal preferences. If Maretti's chimney is
redesigned, then Maretti's property may lose a small portion of its fair
market value, while Prah's property may gain in fair market value after
the removal of an obstruction to his solar collector system. On the other
hand, if Prah must modify his solar collector system, his property's fair
market value will probably remain the same. The fair market value
might increase slightly if the potential problems of freezing in the solar
collector pipes and reduced energy output could be solved by a "techno166 Brief for Appellant at A-29 (testimony of Herbert Zien, Record at 24) (agrees with
Prah testimony that Maretti home without chimney would not be problem). Prah testified
that a chimney on any other side of Maretti's house would eliminate the blockage. Id at A-26
(testimony of Glenn Prah, Record at 24).
167 Brief for Respondent at 35.
168 This narrowing helps alleviate the problem identified in Note, supra note 124, at 296
where the author rejected application of economics to a two party case because judicial machinery and expenses would be too high to identify the most efficient result.
169 See supra note 132 and accompanying text; see also Note, supra note 124, at 297 ("Regardless of the approach it takes, the legal system will always answer these questions in one
fashion or another.").
170 Cf Rabin, supra note 11, at 1303 (citation omitted):
R owns two adjoining parcels of land ...
The question facing R is purely one of efficiency, uncomplicated by questions of fairness. Both the costs and benefits of the course of action taken will
accrue to R. Because R owns both [properties] he need not worry about the
relative legal and moral rights of [his neighbor]. R's only concern, therefore,
is to maximize the value of both properties. He will balance the total costs,
including loss of value of either parcel . ...
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logical innovation." 171 Maretti's fair market value should remain
unchanged.
The gain or loss according to societal preference, the second factor
in the efficiency analysis, is a nebulous issue that should be strongly influenced by legislation, even when the legislature acts after the filing of
the nuisance suit. 172 In Prah v. Mareut1 for example, although the court
recognized that society still places some value on freedom to develop
one's own land,173 while the case was on appeal, the Wisconsin legislature passed a solar zoning law intended to promote the use of solar energy.1 74 Thus, society may favor a result that includes the retention of
Prah's solar energy system.
The final factor that the court must evaluate in the efficiency analysis is the anticipated out-of-pocket costs required to eliminate the land
use conflict under each result. The court would weigh the cost of modifying Prah's solar collector against the cost of redesigning Maretti's
chimney. This factor assures that the greatest gain according to fair
market value tempered by societal preferences is achieved at the lowest
75

cost. 1

c.

Fashioninga Remedy. Armed with its analyses of fairness and ef-

ficiency, the court will proceed to fashion an appropriate remedy. The
court must structure the remedy to yield the disposition in which the
blameworthy party pays for the efficient solution. 176 The court must
171
To a casual observer, it appears that the elimination of a chance of freeze-ups or
significant losses of efficiency would increase the house's fair market value. On the other
hand, the "technological innovation" may be so unwieldy, or unsightly, or delicate, that the
fair market value of Prah's property would be reduced.
172
Although blameworthiness must be examined in light of factors existing at the time
the dispute arose, efficiency must be determined from the perspective of the court at the time
of trial.
Sometimes societal preference overwhelms the remaining elements of a land use framework. See Polinsky, supra note 116, at 1086 ("It will often be convenient to subsume the goals
of efficiency and distributional equity within a more general concept of 'social welfare.' One
can think of social welfare as a weighted average of the two underlying goals . . . "). Ultimately, the three measures of efficiency and some societal preferences for redistribution of
wealth will fall within a weighted average. Nevertheless, until land use frameworks become as
popular with the courts as they are with the commentators, courts would be well advised to
handle each issue separately, lest some possible solution be left by the wayside.
173
See supra notes 102-03, 108-09 and accompanying text.
174
See supra notes 102-04, 106 (discussing Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.031 (West Supp. 1983)).
175
Accord Rabin, supra note 11, at 1303-04 (weigh total costs of alternatives, including
actual disbursements, against total gains to be derived from each alternative); see supra text
accompanying note 116. In Prahv. Marelti the dispute involved an existing use and a contemplated use. When the change in fair market value and the societal preferences do not strongly
indicate one solution or the other, it will usually be less expensive, and therefore more efficient, to modify a contemplated use rather than an existing use.
176
The fashioning of an appropriate remedy is at the heart of the land use framework.
See Rabin,supra note 11, at 1309-12 (proposing that in nuisance cases courts use "conditional
injunctions" to promote economic efficiency without sacrificing fairness, instead of merely
issuing injunctions or awarding damages); cf Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 37, at 1115
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engage in some judicial zoning, but will be armed with its previous de77
terminations of blame and efficiency.
Prahv. Maretti is helpful in illustrating the proper approach to framing remedies when using the land use framework. For this illustration,
assume that the cause of the dispute is either Prah's failure to build on
79
the center of his lot' 78 or Maretti's failure to seek a grade variance.'
Similarly, assume that only two possible resolutions to the problem,
either redesign of Maretti's chimney' 80 or modification of Prah's solar
collector,' 8 ' are before the court. Four dispositions (one of two possible
blameworthy parties paying for one of two potential resolutions) will be
82
examined.
First, if the court determines that the off-center location of Prah's
("Nuisance. . . is, one of the most interesting areas where the question of who will be given
an entitlement, and how it will be protected, is in frequent issue.") (footnote omitted); Polinsky, supra note 116, at 1075 (examining how damages and injunctive remedies can be used to
efficiently and economically resolve land use dispute); Note, supra note 124 (suggesting that
courts apply well-defined economic analysis to resolve land use disputes in order to guide
parties in future disputes).
Some critics may attack this suggested approach for being judicial zoning. The charge of
judicial zoning was implied by the dissent in Prah v. Mareti:
I would submit that any policy decisions in this area are best left for the
legislature. "What is 'desirable' or 'advisable' or 'ought to be' is a question of
policy, not a question of fact. What is 'necessary' or what is 'in the best interest' is not a fact and its determination by the judiciary is an exercise of legislative power when each involves political considerations." . . . (litigation is a
slow, costly and uncertain method of reform). I would concur with these observations of the trial judge: "While temptation lingers for the court to declare
by judicial fiat what is right and what should be done, under the facts in this
case, such action under our form of constitutional government where the
three branches each have their defined jurisdiction and power, would be an
intrusion of judicial egoism over legislative passivity."
108 Wis. 2d at 248, 321 N.W.2d at 195 (Callow, J., dissenting) (quotingln re City of Beloit, 37
Wis. 2d 637, 644, 155 N.W.2d 633, 636 (1968)) (citations omitted). But cf Beuscher & Morrison, supra note 7, at 452 (power of sovereign exercised by judiciary in nuisance cases, same as
power exercised through legislative zoning); Ellickson, supra note 37 (suggesting that legislative zoning may not be best mechanism to regulate land use and that alternative means such
as covenants, nuisance law, and fines should also be considered); Comment, supra note 64, at
53 (courts can apply nuisance law in individual cases to compensate for inequities created by
legislative zoning).
Critics also criticized courts for judicial zoning when they deviated from the pure tort
approach. E.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309
N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970) (Jasen, J., dissenting); see aLso infra notes 194-96, 200-07 and accompanying text.
177 Even if a court does not attempt to engage in judicial zoning, it cannot help but do so.
See Note, supra note 124, at 297. It is better that courts realize the inevitable and make
decisions accordingly, with a view to both efficiency and fairness.
178 See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
179 See supra note 50; text accompanying note 162.
180 See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
181 See supra text accompanying note 167.
182 See supra notes 164-65, 168; infra notes 208-11 and accompanying text.
Although these four dispositions were chosen for purposes of illustration, the land use
framework is flexible enough to handle disputes that do not fit into one of these categories.
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house is the cause of the dispute and that the efficient result is the modification of Prah's solar collector, the court can dismiss the suit. 18

3

A

dismissal leaves Prah to remedy the effects of Maretti's obstruction,
which he is likely to do in the most efficient fashion.184 The expense of
this modification will be borne by Prah because the court has absolved
Maretti of any liability. The court can reach this same disposition
under the Restatement Second approach, but, under that approach, the
court would never expressly address efficiency. The court would merely
conclude that the defendant had not acted unreasonably and would dismiss the suit. 185 Under the land use framework, the judge can be satisfied that a dismissal will produce a fair and efficient result.
Second, if the court decides that Maretti is to blame for not seeking
a variance and that redesign of Maretti's chimney would be the efficient
result, then the court should permanently enjoin Maretti from blocking
Prah's solar collector. 186 When such an injunction flows from the application of the land use framework, it will achieve results that the court
has determined to be fair and efficient. Maretti will need to modify his
plans to avoid another suit that might result in a contempt of court
sanction. 187 The least expensive method for complying with the injunc183
Cf Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 37, at 1115-16 (rule 3); Rabin, supra note 11, at
1310 (chart summarizing solutions resulting from proposed procedure). Rabin's chart does
not explicitly include the remedy of dismissal of the action. On Rabin's chart, if the plaintiff
is at fault, the court should grant an injunction against the defendant if the plaintiff pays the
cost of the defendant's compliance. When the modification of the plaintiff's use is the "efficient" solution, Rabin suggests that the plaintiff "will not attempt to enforce her right to an
injunction conditional upon her payment of the [defendant's] cost of compliance." d
If it would be efficient for the plaintiff to modify her own use at her own expense, Rabin's solution requires a conditional injunction that Rabin does not expect the plaintiff to
purchase. If the plaintiff is perfectly rational and agrees with the court's assessment of efficiency, this disposition amounts to the issuance of a useless piece of paper. On the other
hand, if the plaintiff has a different perception of efficiency from the court, the plaintiff will
purchase the "inefficient" injunction and force the defendant to modify his use. It is much
simpler for the court to dismiss the case and force the plaintiff to follow the efficient solution.
See inffra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
184
Unlike Rabin's "conditional injunction that will not be purchased," see supra note
183, Prah's options do not include forcing an unwilling Maretti to modify his chimney. Of
course, Prah can try to bargain for a modification of Maretti's chimney, but Maretti will have
the leverage that comes from judicial support of his right to leave his chimney unmodified.
185
See supra notes 132, 137 and accompanying text.
186
Cf Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 37, at 1115-16 (rule 1); Rabin, supra note 11, at
1310, suggests that when the defendant is blameworthy, the court should enjoin him from
interfering with the plaintiff's use unless he pays damages equal to the most efficient solution.
He then suggests that if the most efficient solution is a modification of the defendant's use, the
defendant will pay for such modifications in "complying with the injunction." This circuitous path to a "permanent injunction" results from Rabin's chart, rather than his analysis.
Cf supra note 183.
187
The effort to modify future land use relations by remedies beyond mere damages
which would then be enforceable through the power of the state is not new to nuisance law.
The notion of probability was also important if one was to understand the law
of nuisance: [Blackstone stated in 1768 that] "[i]ndeed every continuance of a
nuisance is held to be a fresh one; and therefore a fresh action will lie, and
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tion will be to redesign the chimney,188 an expense Maretti will bear
because the remedy requires no action by Prah. 8 9 This disposition is
also possible under the Restatement Second approach, t 9° but under that
approach the court may concentrate only on the "inadequacy" of a
damage remedy, rather than on the "efficiency" of the result produced
by an injunction.
Third, if Maretti caused the dispute, and the efficient result is to
modify Prah's solar collector, the court should issue a "dissolvable" injunction to resolve the problem.' 9 1 Under the terms of a dissolvable
injunction, the court will enjoin Maretti from blocking Prah's solar colvery exemplary damages will probably be given, if, after one verdict against
him, the defendant has the hardiness to continue it. Yet the founders of the
law of England did not rely upon probabilities merely, in order to give relief
to the injured. They have therefore provided two other actions . . . which
I . . strike at the root and remove the cause itself." Physical and legal
probability were thus made indistinguishable.
D. BOORSTIN, supra note 14, at 132-33 (quoting W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES bk. III
*220).
188 If the injunction forbids Maretti's chimney from casting a shadow upon Prah's solar
collector, Maretti has several options. First, he can bargain with Prah to "buy off" the injunction. In many nuisance cases, especially those involving a polluting factory and residential plaintiffs, injunctions are disfavored for fear of extortion. See Smith v. Staso Milling Co.,
18 F.2d 736, 738 (2d Cir. 1927); Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 225, 257
N.E.2d 870, 873, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 317 (1970); see aso Rabin, supra note 11, at 1344. In this
case the threat of extortion is low; Maretti can easily choose the second or third option if Prah
tries to extort an unreasonable amount for not enforcing the injunction. Prah is unlikely to be
receptive to an offer from Maretti once the court has found Maretti to blame and has concluded that Maretti's chimney should be modified.
Maretti's second option is to change the design of his entire house in order to eliminate
the shadowing. This second option, however, is probably much more expensive, once Maretti
has laid his foundation, than either the first or third options.
Maretti's third option, and the one the court would prefer he elect, is to modify the
design of his chimney or the chimney's location. This option can be achieved at a lower cost
than the second option and without any need for negotiations with Prah, required by the first
option.
189 No matter which of the options Maretti chooses, see supra note 188, Maretti will bear
the cost. If he negotiates, Prah, who has the entitlement, will demand payment. If he modifies the design of his whole house, or his chimney, Maretti will not be able to seek compensation from Prah. If Maretti ignores the injunction and Prah files a suit to enforce the
injunction, Maretti will "pay" through a potential contempt of court sanction.
190 See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
191 Cf. Calabresi &Melamed, supra note 38, at 1115-16 (rule 2). See generally Rabin,supra
note 11, at 1311 ("Only rarely does a plaintiff receive an injunction that is dissolvable if the
defendant pays damages. . . .This article contends that these rarely used conditional injunctions should become the usual remedies. . .[as they] will promote economic efficiency more
effectively without sacrificing fairness."). Rabin further states that "[a]s a general rule, the
appropriate remedy in a nuisance action should be an injunction cancellable upon the payment by the defendant of damages to the plaintiff for past injuries and for future injuries that
would flow from the continuation of the defendant's activities." Id at 1347.
The dissolvable injunction is slightly more complex than a standard damage remedy.
The damage remedy does not specifically address the possibility that the defendant cannot or
will not comply with the damage award. When a defendant fails to pay a damage award, the
plaintiff will have to have the defendant's property attached. Such disposition may not be
efficient. On the other hand, a dissolvable injunction specifically addresses the possibility of a

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:941

lector until he pays the costs of Prah's modifications. Because either
party might opt for a less-than-efficient result,1 92 the court must carefully structure the dissolvable injunction. For example, the dissolvable
injunction might consist of a temporary injunction against any further
construction on Maretti's lot, with the proviso that the injunction will
become permanent, unless Maretti posts a bond for twice the expected
costs of modifying Prah's solar collector. This proviso will force Maretti
to pay for the efficient result, or to forgo any construction. After the
bond has been posted, the court can dissolve the temporary injunction.
For Prah to obtain any of the money from Maretti's bond, the court can
require him to submit estimates for the modifications and an estimate
for the reduction, if any, in the market value of his property. If Prah
does not comply, he will get no money and will still suffer from the
obstruction by Maretti's chimney that he filed suit to prevent. Prah,
then, logically will opt for the choice that generates a damage award to
be paid out of Maretti's bond. After the court approves Prah's estimates,
the court should withhold payment until after Prah has tendered the
bills for the modifications. By withholding both the modification costs
and the compensation for diminished market value, the court forces
Prah to choose the efficient result.
This third disposition is also possible under the Restatement Second
approach.' 93 Under that approach, a damage remedy without an injunction blames Maretti and forces Prah to implement the result. Prah
probably will choose to modify the solar collector with the compensation from the lawsuit. Under that approach, however, Prah will modify
his collector not because the court found that result efficient, rather because the court found that damages adequately compensated Prah for
his injuries.
This disposition has been vilified as an unwarranted foray into judicial zoning. The dissent in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 194 for example,
contended that "[i]n permitting the injunction to become inoperative
upon the payment of permanent damages, the majority is, in effect, lirecalcitrant defendant. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d
870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970); see infia note 192 and accompanying text.
192 The less-than-efficient result includes the possibility that Maretti will choose not to
build his house according to the plans that the court has found most efficient and that Prah
will use the money Maretti pays for a purpose other than the modification of his solar collector. Because the court has already determined that the efficient solution is to have Maretti
finish his house as planned and to pay Prah for the modification of his solar collector, the
remedy should be tailored to meet this particular outcome.
193 In fact, under the Restatement Second approach this result is the preferred one because a
court only will issue an injunction if the damage remedy would be inadequate. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 951 (1979); see also supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
194 26 N.Y.2d 219, 230, 257 N.E.2d 870, 876, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 321 (1970) (Jasen, J.,
dissenting); accord Hulbert v. Portland Cement Co., 161 Cal. 239, 245, 118 P. 928, 930 (1911);
Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 208 N.Y. 1, 101 N.E. 805 (1913).
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censing a continuing wrong. . . . This kind of inverse condemnation
may not be invoked by a private person. . . for private gain or advantage."1 95 The majority in Boomer countered: "All of the attributions of
economic loss to the properties on which plaintiffs' complaints are based
will have been redressed. . . . Thus it seems fair to both sides to grant
permanent damages to plaintiffs which will terminate this litigation." 196

The result in Boomer was a sacrifice of the plaintiffs' property compensated by permanent damages. In the solar access case, a total sacrifice of
the plaintiffs property will not be required because the plaintiffs use
and the defendant's use generally can coexist with a mere modification.
Fourth, if the court finds that Prah is at fault for building his house
off-center, and that efficiency dictates that Maretti should redesign his
chimney, the court should impose a purchased injunction.1 9 7 In this disposition, if Prah pays for the redesign of Maretti's chimney and the de195 26 N.Y.2d at 230, 257 N.E.2d at 876, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 321 (Jasen, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
196 Id at 226, 228, 257 N.E.2d at 873, 875, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 317, 319; see also Rabin, supra
note 11, at 1331-32 (ameliorating charge that land use framework is "soft on polluters" by
pointing out that land use framework gives plaintiff right to injunction even when plaintiff is
blameworthy, and will make courts more willing to give plaintiff some relief "because damages rather than injunctions would be the customary remedy against polluters").
[T]he law recognizes that private parties can and should be able to exercise a
kind of eminent domain where the gains outweigh the loss to society that
flows from limiting a landowner's right to refuse to sell his property rights.
This principle should apply in the nuisance context as well. Thus, nothing
should be sacrosanct about protecting a landowner from a nuisance by an
injunction rather than by an award of damages.
Id at 1334 (citations omitted); f Powell, The Relationship Between Property Rights and Civil
Rights, 15 HASTINGS L.J. 135, 149-50 (1963) ("Property rights cannot be used as a shibboleth
to cloak conduct which adversely affects . . . others.").

197 Cf Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 37, at 1116 (rule 4) (focus of their model building was to point out possibility' that one remedy to nuisance dispute could be that plaintiff
pay to enjoin the nuisance); Ellickson, supra note 37, at 738 & n.202 (compensated injunction); Polinsky, supra note 116, at 1086 n.31 (emphasis in original):
While a remedy allowing the resident to halt the factory's activity, even
at the cost of paying court-determined damages, may seem like an injunction,
such a remedy is in fact the logical counterpart to the conventional damage
remedy with the entitlement to the resident. Under the conventional damage
remedy, the factory is allowed to continue its polluting activity, but must pay
the resident court-determined damages. Under the present version of the
damage remedy, the resident is entitled to continue his activity-pollutionfree enjoyment of his property, which implies a right to halt or reduce the
factory's activity-but must pay court-determined damages to the factory.
Rabin explains one reason for granting this purchased injunction to a blameworthy plaintiff:
[Where the plaintiff does not deserve an entitlement, the proposed rule suggests that he nevertheless receive an injunction conditional on his paying the
defendant's costs of compliance. This procedure would tend to protect the
plaintiff from extortionate behavior by the defendant. A court desiring to
grant the initial entitlement to the defendant therefore, will not be deterred
by the fear of encouraging extortion. For this reason, the defendant justly
deserving the initial entitlement will be more likely to receive it than he
would under the traditional rule, which simply denies plaintiff an injunction
when defendant is given the initial entitlement.
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cline in the fair market value of Maretti's property, then the court will
enjoin Maretti from blocking Prah's solar access. The efficient result
may be harder to ensure with the fourth disposition than with the first
three dispositions; nonetheless, the court should attempt to fashion a
remedy to bring about the efficient result.
For example, the court can first enter a temporary restraining order
against Maretti prohibiting him from obstructing Prah's solar access.
The restraining order will expire unless Prah posts a bond. If Prah allows the restraining order to expire, Maretti can build his chimney as
planned. This result would be inefficient, because Prah will modify his
solar collector, even though the court found that redesign of Maretti's
chimney was the most efficient solution.198 If Prah does post the bond,
then the court should turn the temporary restraining order into a permanent injunction. Maretti would then use the bond to redesign his
chimney at Prah's expense. t 99
The court can increase the likelihood that Prah will post the bond
by limiting the amount of the bond to the expected cost of Maretti's
redesigned chimney and loss in fair market value. 2°° Prah will post the
bond if he would rather pay to redesign Maretti's chimney than to redesign his own solar collectors. Posting the bond will probably be less expensive than bargaining with Maretti. Whatever Prah decides to do, he
20
ultimately "pays" for the result. '
Maretti is likely to acquiesce in the result for three reasons. First,
he will want to finish his house.20 2 Second, he will want to be reimbursed for the changes in the design of his chimney and the diminished
fair market value caused by the redesign. 20 3 Finally, he will not want to
Rabin, supra note 11, at 1346. The court ordered this remedy in Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E.
Webb Dev. Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972).
198 At first glance, Prah would be irrational not to post the bond required by the
purchased injunction. Actually, Prah might rationally fail to act if he later concludes that the
dangers from a shadow are no longer substantial. For this reason, if a court has found Prah to
blame but is unsure of the efficient solution, it should elect this fourth solution and let Prah
determine which solution is most efficient. This disposition is preferable to dismissal of the
case, because with a dismissal, Maretti may require an inefficiently prohibitive amount from
Prah before agreeing to modify his chimney.
199 Cf Polinsky, supra note 116, at 1086 n.31 (quoted supra note 197); Rabin, supra note
11, at 1310 (chart summarizing proposed solutions; assumes plaintiff will comply with
purchased injunction).
200
As mentioned, supra note 198, Prah may be indifferent, or even adverse to paying for
the redesign of Maretti's chimney. By limiting the amount of bond, the court at least avoids
encouraging these "inefficient" tendencies. Even if Prah desires the efficient solution, requiring a bond of twice the expected costs might "force" him into an inefficient solution.
201
Cf supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text. Thus, under a criterion of fairness,
absent an argument about absolute land ownership, the proposed fourth remedy and the first
remedy, which is well-accepted, are equally just.
202
Once the bond is posted, the injunction against obstruction becomes permanent.
Maretti faces several options. See supra notes 199-203 and accompanying text.
203
Because the court is willing to have Prah compensate Maretti for his entire loss,
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risk a contempt of court sanction.
The outcome under the fourth disposition cannot be achieved
under the Restatement Second approach. Under that approach the court
will dismiss the suit if Prah is to blame. Prah then would take the inefficient step of modifying his solar collector.2 0 4 This fourth disposition
under the land use framework, however, requires the deepest foray into
judicial zoning,20 5 because the judge will "force" a solution on a nonblameworthy defendant. Unlike the third disposition, the party must
accept a result, even though he neither brought the conflict before the
court nor is blameworthy for creating the dispute. Nevertheless, the result can be more efficient than dismissing the suit. 20 6 The court must
ultimately choose between engaging in judicial zoning, which will produce a fair and efficient result using a land use framework, and follow-

ing the Restatement Second framework, which will produce a fair, but
207
inefficient result.
The court's determinations of fault and efficiency may require
other dispositions. For example, the court may find both parties or a
third party blameworthy. 20 8 The court may determine that a combination of the proposed results is more efficient than any of the proposed
Maretti should take advantage of the offer, when the alternative is facing contempt of court
sanctions. Cf supra note 187 and accompanying text.
204 See supra notes 132, 137 and accompanying text. Under the Restatement Second approach, a finding of Prah as the blameworthy party would result in the dismissal of the case.
Prah will modify his solar collector because the dismissal will allow Maretti to proceed with
the construction of his proposed house with impunity. Under the proposed framework, if the
court fails to "force" upon the parties the efficient solution of redesigning Maretti's chimney,
then Prah will elect to modify his solar collector rather than purchase the injunction-the
result reached under the Restatement Second approach.
205 The only case employing this fourth remedy to date is Spur Indus. Inc. v. Del E.
Webb Dev. Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972). In Spur, the plaintiff, a building developer alleged that the defendant's nearby feed lot interfered with his purchasers' use and enjoyment and adversely affected the sales of his houses. The court held that the defendant had
not been at fault, but due to the large number of residents inconvenienced by the feedlot, the
efficient solution would be for the feedlot to be relocated, at the developer's expense. This
disposition was clearly judicial zoning.
Calabresi and Melamed, supra note 37, at 1116, observe that this potential remedy,
"[u]nlike the first three. . . does not often lend itself to judicial imposition for a number of
good legal process reasons." Among these reasons are first, the difficulty of apportioning the
costs among the plaintiffs and second, the "freeloader" problem, when more people than the
plaintiffs will benefit from the injunction. Calabresi and Melamed recognize, however, that
the purchased injunction "is available, and may sometimes make more sense than any of the
three competing approaches." Id at 1117. The solar access nuisance suit will often be such
an appropriate setting because there will rarely be an apportionment or freeloader problem.
206 See supra note 137 and accompanying text. The court, having more experience under
the Restatement Second in determining blame than efficiency, is more likely to dismiss the suit
(fair, but possibly inefficient) than it is to issue a permanent injunction (possibly efficient, but
probably unfair).
207 Perhaps the attraction of a tort approach is that the court will not have to break new
ground, but that approach offers the court principles that answer only half of the questions
needed to flexibly resolve a nuisance dispute. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
208 See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:941

results standing alone. 20 9 The court must use its full range of remedial
powers to fashion a fair and efficient disposition of the case.2 10 This
flexibility is needed "to protect both a landowner's right of access to
sunlight and another landowner's right to develop land. 2 1 The flexibility of the land use framework makes it superior to the Restatement
Second approach suggested by the Prah court.
CONCLUSION

In Prah v. Marettz; the Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to extend
the traditional per se non-nuisance conclusion to the blockage of light in
a solar access nuisance dispute. Instead, the court chose the Restatement
(Second) of Torts nuisance doctrine to resolve this solar access conflict.
A better approach is the more flexible land use framework, which evaluates fairness and efficiency in two separate stages before addressing the
remedy. Using this framework, a court can resolve a solar access dispute
without sacrificing efficiency or fairness.
Steven A

Cherin

209 For example, the court might determine that a backup heating system will be needed
to prevent freeze-ups on Prah's solar collectors and that Maretti's chimney must be moved,
even though Maretti's roof will still cast some shadow on Prah's roof.
210
Determinations of blame and efficiency that fall outside of the four dispositions that
this analysis presents should not dissuade a court from f6llowing the land use framework
through to the finish. Not only is it beyond the scope of this Note to delineate precisely the
remedy for each of these potential determinations, but it is also contrary to the underlying
goals of the land use framework here proposed. The framework should allow a court to make
independent inquiries into fault and efficiency before fashioning an appropriate remedy. If
pat answers are provided, these other dispositions may become "boxes into which one then
feels compelled to force situations which do not truly fit." Calabresi & Melamed, supra note
37, at 1128.
211
108 Wis. 2d at 239, 321 N.W.2d at 191.

